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ABSTRACT
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)
Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial
Reporting states that (GASB 1987, 27) "Financial
reporting should assist in fulfilling government's duty
to be publicly accountable and should enable users to
assess that accountability."

Government accountability

requires that public officials answer to the citizenry.
Further, accountability rests on the notion that the
citizenry has a "right to know" (GASB 1987, 21) .
Therefore, according to GASB Concepts Statement No. 1,
municipal accounting data should reflect public resource
allocation decisions made by government officials.

This

study investigates the usefulness of municipal
accounting data for modeling a particular public
resource allocation decision: the decision to privatize
residential sanitation collection (RSC).
Data from Louisiana municipalities are used in this
study.

Inferential statistics are used to characterize

the two groups of municipalities (those that privatize
RSC and those that do not privatize RSC) in terms of
demographic and financial variables.

Public choice

theory and the theory of bureaucracy are used to suggest
municipal accounting information that is useful for
modeling the municipal decision to privatize RSC.
Logistic regression (logit) analysis is employed to test
vii

whether municipal accounting data is useful for modeling
the municipal decision to privatize RSC.

The

explanatory value of the overall model is evaluated
using a chi-square statistic.

Chi-square tests of the

individual coefficients in the logit model are used to
test the individual hypotheses.

Five of the nine

independent variables are statistically significant at
the .10 level.
The major conclusion of this study is that public
resource allocation decisions are impounded in the
municipal accounting numbers.

This finding makes it

possible to assess the accountability of public
officials by using municipal accounting data.
Furthermore, public choice theory and the theory of
bureaucracy provide the theoretical underpinnings
necessary to develop models of public resource
allocation decisions using municipal accounting data.

viii

CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
Introduction
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB)
Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial
Reporting states that (GASB 1987, 27): "Financial
reporting should assist in fulfilling government's duty
to be publicly accountable and should enable users to
assess that accountability."

Government accountability

requires that public officials answer to the citizenry
and rests on the notion that the citizenry has a "right
to know"

(GASB 1987, 21).

Therefore, according to GASB

Concept Statement No. 1, municipal financial records
should reflect public resource allocation decisions made
by government officials.

The ability of municipal

accounting data to reflect public resource allocation
decisions has not received much attention in the
accounting literature.

This study investigates the

usefulness of municipal accounting data for modeling a
particular public resource allocation decision: the
decision to privatize residential sanitation collection
(RSC).

1

RSC is one of the most important public services a
municipal government provides to its residents and the
cost of this service is not inconsequential.

Depending

on the range of services offered, a local government may
devote as much as 3 0% of its budget to RSC (Savas 1979,
25).

Municipal residents pay for RSC via personal taxes

(e.g., property taxes, general sales taxes) or user fees
based upon the cost of the service.

Regardless of the

financing arrangement, city residents bear the cost.
While municipalities generally provide (i.e.,
finance) RSC, they do not necessarily engage in the
actual production of the service.

That is, a

municipality has a choice regarding who actually
performs RSC.

Two alternatives to using municipal

employees for RSC are:

(1) contracting with a private

sector firm, and (2) contracting with another
governmental unit (e.g., city, county).
The purpose of this study is to investigate the
usefulness of municipal accounting data for modeling the
municipal decision to privatize RSC.

Privatization, as

used in this study, refers to the contracting out of a
municipal service to a private sector firm.

This

definition of privatization implies that the production
of a service is turned over to a private sector firm
while financing remains the responsibility of the
municipality.

Throughout this study privatized RSC and

contract RSC are used interchangeably and refer to an
arrangement whereby RSC is carried out by a private
sector firm under contract with a municipality.
RSC is the focus of this study for three reasons:
(1) the importance of RSC to city residents,

(2) the

widespread proliferation of privatized RSC, and (3) the
existing body of literature concerning the privatization
of RSC provides a solid foundation on which to build.
Each of these reasons is discussed below.
Millar (1983, 191) summarizes the importance of
RSC:
Residential solid waste collection is one of the
most basic of all municipal services.
It is
estimated that American households alone discard [a
lot] of solid waste each year and all of it needs
to be collected.
Given the magnitude of the problem, it is not
surprising that residential solid waste collection
is an important issue for every city.
The highly visible effect of RSC on the appearance of a
community and its impact on public health combine to
create concern among local government officials (Savas
1979, 25).
While many public services are privatized in the
United States, some services possess qualities which
increase their attractiveness to private sector firms.
A partial listing of services that are often privatized
includes: airports, data processing, fleet or vehicle
maintenance, hospitals, parking lots or garages, public
safety or corrections, RSC or disposal, transit or

transportation, utilities, and vehicle towing or
storage.

RSC is a likely candidate for privatization

because the necessary inputs to production are abundant
in the economy (e.g., unskilled labor and specific
capital).

Also, the costs for private sector firms to

enter into (and exit from) the RSC market are relatively
low.

This propensity for private sector firms to enter

into the RSC market is apparent from the results of a
1987 survey of privatization in America, sponsored by
Touche Ross (now Deloitte Touche), the International
City Management Association (ICMA), and the
Privatization Council:
. . . the services most frequently contracted
out in the last five years have been solid-waste
collection or disposal (nearly 60%) , vehicle towing
or storage (45%), and building or grounds
maintenance and service (nearly 45%) (David 1988,
47) .
According to David (1988, 47), these same services are
expected to remain among the most frequently privatized.
Finally, there exists a substantial volume of prior
research regarding the privatization of RSC.

Most

empirical studies compare the cost of contract RSC with
the cost of municipal RSC.

The majority of these

studies find that municipal RSC is more costly than
contract RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; Stevens 1978;
Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; Berenyi and
Stevens 1988).

If this is true, one must wonder why so

many municipalities use municipal employees for RSC.

This particular issue has not received much attention in
the literature.

The present study provides some

insights as to the determinants of the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.
Millar (1983) identifies the following methods of
RSC as the five most popular RSC arrangements in use in
the United States:
1.

Municipal— RSC is carried out by municipal
employees.

2.

Contract— RSC is carried out by a private
sector firm under contract with the local
government.

3.

Franchise— RSC is carried out by a private
sector firm that is awarded the exclusive
right to operate in a specific area by the
local government.

Under this arrangement the

firm is paid directly by the individual
citizens.
4.

Private— RSC is carried out by a private
sector firm hired and paid directly by its
customers (the citizens). The firm does not
have exclusive rights, therefore, several
firms may engage in RSC in the same geographic
area.

5.

Self-Service— each household delivers its own
refuse to a disposal site or transfer station.

The data for the present study is drawn from the
State of Louisiana which has 301 municipalities.
Louisiana is dominated by small municipalities
(population less than 10,000).

This is a significant

feature of the data because of the limited amount of
prior research regarding small governmental units.1
Privatization of municipal services is a topic that
concerns public officials, public employees, citizens,
and scholars.

Each of these groups has an interest in a

decision regarding the privatization of municipal
services.

The cost of privatization in economic as well

as political terms is important to public officials.
Public employees fear they will lose their jobs because
of privatization.

Citizens are interested in the impact

of privatization on the taxes they pay as well as the
quality of services they receive.

Finally, scholars

seek to understand the economic and political impact of
privatization, as well as the factors that influence the
decision to privatize.
Most academic research regarding privatization is
published in the fields of economics, political science,
and public administration.

One line of research

compares the cost of private sector service delivery to
the cost of public sector service delivery, showing that
St a l l i n g s and Ferris (1988) find that between 1940
and 1984 less than 24% of the papers in Public
Administration Review focus on local government.

private sector service delivery is less costly than
public sector service delivery (e.g., Deacon 1979,
McGuire and Van Cott 1984, Ferris 1988).

A second area

of research utilizes the tools of economics to
investigate the political forces that drive political
decision making (e.g., McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott
1987).

This second area of research is within the realm

of public choice theory.

The present study employs the

public choice approach.
Theoretical Framework
The decision to privatize RSC is a public resource
allocation decision.

Decisions regarding the allocation

of public resources are made via the political process.
The political process is a complex set of interactions
between voters, politicians, and bureaucrats.

To

understand the decisions resulting from this complex set
of interactions a comprehensive theoretical framework is
necessary to model the behavior of voters, politicians,
and bureaucrats.

Public choice theory and the theory of

bureaucracy provide the foundation for such a
theoretical framework.
Public choice theory maintains that in a democracy,
such as the United States, voters decide how public
funds are expended.

In a representative democracy,

voters elect public officials on the assumption that,
once elected, the official will make decisions that are

in the best interest of the citizenry.

The median voter

model (Hotelling 1929; Bowen 1943; Downs 1957)

is the

dominant theoretical framework for investigating
government spending.

The median voter model is based on

the premise that in a simple majority rule election the
voter with the median preferences is the deciding vote.
Therefore, politicians will seek the support of the
median voter.

According to the median voter theorem,

the allocation of public resources coincides with the
preferences of the median voter.
The theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971) maintains
that bureaucrats are utility maximizers that do not rely
on votes to remain in their jobs.

Because they are

isolated from the voting mechanism, bureaucrats are able
to allocate public resources such that their personal
utility is maximized.

Therefore, to understand

bureaucratic decision making, the arguments of a
bureaucrat’s utility function must be known.

According

to Niskanen (1971) one of the arguments in the utility
function of a bureaucrat is the size of his or her
budget.

Accordingly, a bureaucrat attempts to maximize

his or her budget.
Bureaucrats serve under elected politicians.
Therefore, bureaucrats can only act as self-interested
utility maximizers so long as they do not jeopardize the
political careers of the politicians they serve.

The

9
present study synthesizes public choice theory and the
theory of bureaucracy into an unified theoretical
framework to analyze the municipal decision to privatize
RSC.

In this framework, bureaucrats are utility

maximizers constrained by the political process and
voters are rationally ignorant regarding political
issues.

That is, voters only become politically active

when the benefits of political activity exceed the costs
of becoming politically active (Downs 1957).

The

rational ignorance of voters implies that there is a
range of government activity within which voters are
apathetic.

This range is referred to herein as the

"range of voter indifference."

According to this

framework, a bureaucrat seeks to maximize personal
utility, disregarding the best interests of the
citizenry, within the range of voter indifference.
Outside of the range of voter indifference, voters
mobilize and react to political events, forcing
bureaucrats to implement policies more consistent with
their desires.

Tax increases beyond some threshold

level and the perception of excessive waste in
government are two issues that typically mobilize voters
into action.

The range of voter indifference provides

some insight as to why some observed public resource
allocation decisions are not always necessarily in the
best interest of the citizenry.

10
Research Question
Prior research suggests that contract RSC is less
costly than municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977;
Stevens 1978; Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985;
Berenyi and Stevens 1988).

However, there are many

municipalities that do not use contract RSC.

Therefore,

decision makers in the public sector (i.e., bureaucrats)
are not minimizing costs.

Niskanen (1971) provides a

theoretical rationale (i.e., the theory of bureaucracy)
for the lack of cost minimizing behavior on the part of
bureaucrats.

Public choice theory provides a framework

for predicting the actions of voters and politicians.
Together, public choice theory and the theory of
bureaucracy provide the foundation for a comprehensive
theory of public resource allocation decisions.

The

present study combines public choice theory with the
theory of bureaucracy to investigate the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.

The principal research

question is:
Is municipal accounting data useful for modeling
the municipal decision to privatize RSC?
Hypotheses derived from public choice theory and the
theory of bureaucracy are used to investigate this
research question.

Municipal accounting data are used

to operationalize the hypotheses.

Municipal accounting data is a written, historical,
and verifiable record of public resource allocation
decisions.

Prior research suggests that municipal

accounting data is useful in explaining voter behavior
since it measures the effects of policy decisions
consistent with voter assessment (Ingram and Copeland
1981, 830).

The present study is a response to a call

for additional research regarding the usefulness of
municipal accounting information (Ingram and Copeland
1981, 841).
Method
A survey of Louisiana municipalities is used to
obtain data for this study.

The survey ascertains the

method of RSC, the cost of RSC, as well as other data
necessary for the study.

Inferential statistics are

used to characterize the two groups of municipalities
(those that privatize RSC and those that do not
privatize RSC) in terms of demographic and financial
variables.

Public choice theory and the theory of

bureaucracy are used to guide the selection of municipal
accounting data useful for modeling the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.

Logistic regression (logit)

analysis is employed to test the extent to which
municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the
municipal decision to privatize RSC.

Multicollinearity

among the independent variables in a logit model can

make the interpretation of the individual coefficients
difficult.

Therefore, the independent variables are

examined for evidence of multicollinearity.

The

explanatory value of the model is evaluated using a
chi-square statistic.

Chi-square tests of the

individual coefficients in the logit model are used to
test the individual hypotheses.
Contributions of the Study
The GASB Concepts Statement No. 1, ''Objectives of
Financial Reporting," implies that governmental
financial reports should reflect public resource
allocation decisions (GASB 1987).

This study

demonstrates the use of municipal accounting data for
modeling a particular public resource allocation
decision: the decision to privatize RSC.

Public choice

theory and the theory of bureaucracy guide the selection
of municipal accounting data to operationalize the
determinants of the decision to privatize RSC.

While

the decision to privatize RSC is a specific public
resource allocation decision, this study illustrates how
a theoretical framework which incorporates public choice
theory and the theory of bureaucracy can be used to
suggest municipal accounting data useful for modeling
other public resource allocation decisions.

Thus, this

study strengthens the link between municipal accounting

data, public choice theory, and the theory of
bureaucracy.
This study synthesizes public choice theory and the
theory of bureaucracy into an unified theory of
constrained bureaucratic decision making.

That is, a

formal framework is presented which models bureaucratic
decision making that is constrained by the political
process (i.e., voters and politicians).

While the

specific decision of privatization of RSC is the focus
of this study, the theoretical framework should be
useful for investigating other public resource
allocation decisions.
The decision regarding how municipal services are
delivered is a public resource allocation decision.
Once the decision to provide a public service is made,
the mode of service delivery must be considered.

This

study investigates two modes of RSC: municipal— -where
RSC is carried out by municipal employees, and
contract— where RSC is carried out by a private sector
firm under contract with a municipality.
Prior research suggests that contract RSC is less
costly than municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977;
Stevens 1978; Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985;
Berenyi and Stevens 1988).

However, prior research uses

data from municipalities with populations greater than
10,000.

This study uses data from Louisiana

municipalities, the majority of which are small
(population less than 10,000).

Therefore, this study

extends the current body of literature by providing
empirical evidence regarding the effect of privatization
on the cost of RSC in small municipalities.
According to the

U.S. Bureau of Census (1989,

285), 88% of all municipal governments serve less than
10,000 people; 94% of all township governments serve
less than 10,000 people; and 23% of all county
governments serve less than 10,000 people.

However, in

an examination of articles appearing in Public
Administration Review between 1940 and 1984, Stallings
and Ferris (1988, 583) find a rather small percentage
(less than 24%) of papers concerning local government.
The majority of articles focus on the federal
government, while state government appears to be a
popular topic during the decade of the 1950s.

Cornia

and Usher (1981, 74-75) also allude to the lack of
research regarding local governments.

They point out

that most budgeting research deals with state and
federal government and results are often generalized to
the local level.

Such generalizations, however, may not

be appropriate because of institutional differences that
exist between local governments and federal/state
governments (Cornia and Usher 1981, 75).

For example,

unlike local governments, the federal government is not

required to submit a balanced budget (Cornia and Usher
1981, 75).

The present study contributes to the

existing body of literature by providing empirical
evidence regarding the determinants of the decision to
privatize RSC by small municipalities (i.e.,
municipalities serving less than 10,000 people).
Summary
This chapter provides an overview of the study.
GASB Concept Statement No. 1 is presented as the
motivation for the study.

Public choice theory and the

theory of bureaucracy are presented as the building
blocks of a comprehensive theoretical framework for
investigating the usefulness of municipal accounting
data for modeling public resource allocation decisions.
The research question and research method are described.
The contributions of the study are also discussed.

The

remaining chapters present a review of the literature
relevant to the study, a formal presentation of the
theoretical framework, a detailed description of the
research method, an analysis of the data, and the
conclusions of the study.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this chapter is to review the
literature relevant to the present study.
literature is separated into four sections.

The
The first

section reviews studies regarding the efficiency of
public sector vs. private sector production of
government services. The second section analyzes
research that investigates the determinants of the
privatization decision.

The third section discusses

public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy.

The

fourth section reviews studies that use logit or probit
to investigate the determinants of accounting choices.
Efficiency of Public Versus
Private Production
Many studies document the efficiency of private
sector production over public sector production.2
Generally, three reasons account for the efficiency of
private sector production.

First, competition in the

2 For example, Ahlbrandt (1973) investigates fire
protection; Kitchen (1976), Savas (1977), Stevens (1978),
Bennett & Johnson (1979), McDavid (1985), and Berenyi &
Stevens (1988) all investigate refuse collection; and
McGuire & Van Cott (1984) investigate school bus
transportation.
16

production of services tends to drive costs down since
the marketplace forces high priced, inefficient firms
out of business.

Second, private sector firms can take

advantage of scale economies since they are not
constrained by geographical boundaries.

Therefore,

private sector firms can choose an optimal size or scale
of operation— a choice typically unavailable to
municipalities (Spann 1977, 89).

Finally, the incentive

structure for the manager of a private sector enterprise
is more conducive to efficient production than the
incentive structure of the public bureaucracy (Spann
1977, 89).

This is true because many private sector

enterprises offer salaries that can be increased via
efficient production such as a bonus plan based on net
income.

However, municipal managers rarely have such

bonus plans to provide an incentive to operate
efficiently.
Kitchen
Kitchen (1976) uses data from 48 Canadian
municipalities (all with populations in excess of
10,000) to study the factors affecting the average unit
cost of refuse collection.

The results suggest that

refuse collection costs increase:

(1) when the site of

collection is at the rear of a dwelling,
snowfall increases,

(2) as annual

(3) as weekly labor cost per truck

increase, and (4) as population density increases.

On

the contrary, refuse collection costs decrease:

(1 ) when

specialized collection vehicles are used,

(2 ) as the

number of persons per household increase,

(3) as the

proportion of residential only collection increases, and
(4) when contract collection is used rather than
municipal collection (Kitchen 1976, 72).
Savas
Savas (1977) reports the results of a study of the
prevalence and comparative efficiency of municipal vs.
contract RSC for cities with populations between 2,500
and 750,000.

In this study, efficiency is defined as

cost per household.

This definition of efficiency

eliminates the need to obtain cost information from
contract firms.

Instead, only the prices they charge

(which include profits) are necessary (Savas 1977, 58) .
The findings indicate that municipal and contract
RSC account for 4 6.9% of the 2,531 cities in the study,
with municipal RSC being almost twice as popular as
contract RSC (30.3% and 16.6% respectively).

Other

arrangements such as franchise, private, and selfservice account for the remainder of the cities in the
study.

The results also indicate that for cities with a

population in excess of 50,000, contract RSC is more
efficient (i.e., cost less per household) than municipal
RSC.

However,

for cities with populations between 2,500

and 2 0 ,0 0 0 , there are no significant differences between

the cost of municipal RSC and contract RSC.

According

to Savas (1977, 73-74), some of the policy implications
of these results are:

(1 ) cities with less than 20,000

residents may be able to lower there RSC cost per
household by forming larger markets of up to 50,000 in
population, and contracting out RSC to "a single
organization— public or private" (Savas 1977, 73);

(2)

cities with 50,000 to 100,000 residents may
significantly lower the cost of RSC per household by
contracting with a private sector firm; and (3) the best
approach for cities in excess of 100,000 residents is to
divide up the city into several districts and have one
or more of the districts serviced by a municipal agency
while the other districts are contracted out to one or
more private sector firms.
The Savas (1977) study uses 1970 Census data, and
includes only those U.S. cities with populations in
excess of 2,500 that are within a 11. . . Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) lying entirely
within a single state and having a total population of
less than 1,500,000"

(Savas 1977, 54).

The size of the

cities in the Savas (1977) study range from 2,500 to
750,000 in population.
The present study uses more recent data, and
includes all municipalities within a single state
(Louisiana).

The size of the municipalities in the
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present study range from 430 to 556,913 in population.
Since many of the municipalities in Louisiana are very
small (population less than 2,500) a comparison of the
cost of municipal RSC and contract RSC for very small
communities is possible.

Data from a single state

excludes some of the confounding factors present when
using data from many different states.
Stevens
Stevens (1978) examines the effect of market
structure, degree of competition, and market size on the
cost of RSC.

Three market structures are investigated:

(1) private monopoly, in which RSC is carried out by a
private sector firm under contract with a municipality;
(2) public monopoly, in which RSC is carried out by a
public agency; and (3) competitive, in which RSC is
performed by several different organizations (e.g.,
private sector firm, public agency, etc).

The dependent

variable in this study is total cost to households
served.

An ordinary least squares regression is used to

determine whether market structure impacts on the ratio
of total costs to households served.

Market size and

service level are held constant in the analysis.
The data for this study is from 340 cities
throughout the Unites States.

The populations of these

cities range from 2,500 to over 700,000.

For cities

with populations less than 50,000, Stevens (1978) finds

no significant difference in the cost of RSC when
comparing the private monopoly arrangement to the public
monopoly arrangement.

However, for cities with

populations greater than 50,000, the public monopoly
arrangement is significantly more costly than the
private monopoly arrangement.

Stevens (1978, 447)

concludes that the cost differences are due to different
management and production techniques for the two
arrangements.
(1978)

In support of this conclusion, Stevens

finds that private monopolist are more likely to

use smaller work crews, larger collection vehicles, and
vehicles that can be loaded from the front or side
rather than the rear.

Also, absenteeism is

significantly lower for private monopolist.

These

findings suggest that private monopolist are superior to
public monopolist (i.e., bureaucrats) with respect to
minimizing costs.
Bennett and Johnson
Bennett and Johnson (1979) compare the cost of
county RSC to the cost of private RSC.

The fees charged

by private RSC firms operating in Fairfax County,
Virginia are compared to the fees charged by the Fairfax
County Solid Waste Division of Public Works.

The

Fairfax (iounty Solid Waste Division services
approximately one-third of the homes in Fairfax County.
The remaining homes contract individually with one of
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the 29 private sector firms that operate in the area
(Bennett and Johnson 1979, 58-59).
A t-test finds that private RSC is significantly
less costly than county RSC.

Bennett and Johnson (1979)

footnote the fact that the county services an area that
is further from the sanitary landfill than the area
serviced by the private sector firms.

This geographical

difference confounds their t-test results since the cost
of traveling this additional distance automatically
increases the county's RSC costs.

This factor is not

taken into account by a simple t-test.
McDavid
McDavid (1985) reports the results of a study of
privatization in the RSC industry in Canada.

A

questionnaire mailed to all Canadian cities excepting
Quebec with 1976 populations in excess of 10,000 is used
to collect data for this study.

McDavid (1985) obtains

a 61.5% response rate.
Three institutional arrangements dominate Canadian
cities:

(1 ) municipal— in which public employees are

responsible for RSC;

(2) contract— in which private

sector firms under contract with a municipality are
responsible for RSC; and (3) mixed— in which most RSC is
the responsibility of municipal employees while private
sector firms under contract with the municipality are
responsible for the remaining RSC.

McDavid (1985) finds that municipal RSC is the most
expensive arrangement ($42.29 per household), while
contract RSC is the least expensive ($28.02 per
household) arrangement.

The cost of municipal RSC in

mixed systems ($31.31) is more costly than a strictly
contract arrangement, but less costly than a strictly
municipal arrangement.

According to McDavid (1985,

604), the difference between the cost of municipal RSC
and contract RSC is due to.managerial differences.
McDavid (1985) finds that private sector firms use
smaller work crews, larger capacity vehicles, and pay
lower wages.
The McDavid (1985) study suggests that private
sector firms are superior to municipal agencies with
respect to minimizing costs.

The results also indicate

that competition forces all producers (both public
sector and private sector) to minimize costs.

The

absence of competition under the strictly municipal
arrangement apparently provides an environment in which
minimizing costs is not necessary.
McDavid (1985) also investigates the effect of
privatization on the cost of RSC for two individual
Canadian municipalities.

The analyses indicate that

privatization results in substantial savings.

However,

since only two cities are analyzed these results must be
viewed as antidotal.

Valid statistical inferences are

possible only when data from many observations are
examined.
Berenyi and Stevens
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) compare contract service
delivery with municipal service delivery for eight local
services (one of which is RSC).

The analyses focus on

differences in the cost of providing the service, and
the quality of the service, as well as, the reasons for
any observed cost differences.

Data for this study

include cities in the Los Angeles Standard Consolidated
Statistical Area with populations between 10,000 and
250,000.
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) find that contracting is
less costly for all eight of the services investigated.
The difference is statistically significant for six of
the services.

Municipal RSC is significantly more

costly than contract RSC (a = .05).

The results also

indicate that differences in the quality of service are
not statistically significant.

Berenyi and Stevens

(1988, 17) conclude that the lower costs associated with
contract RSC (in comparison to municipal RSC) are
probably due to differences in management and personnel
policies.
Berenyi and Stevens (1988) find that private sector
organizations make use of incentive systems more often
and have fewer levels of management between program

directors and direct labor workers (a = .05).
addition, private sector organizations:

In

(1 ) are more

likely to grant managers the authority to hire and fire
workers,

(2) have lower absentee rates,

vacation days per worker,
tenured) workers,

(4) offer fewer

(5) utilize younger (less

(6 ) have a smaller percentage of

workers that are unionized, and (7) have ratios of
fringe benefits to total salaries and wages that tend to
be lower than public sector organizations (all
significant at the .01 level).

These finding support

the notion that private sector organizations are managed
differently than public sector organizations.
Deacon
Deacon (1979), in a study of 64 cities in Los
Angeles county, finds that cities that purchase services
from county or private sector vendors spend
significantly less than cities that choose to produce
their own services.

Deacon classifies cities as either

"producing" or "purchasing" according to the percentage
of budgeted outlays contracted out.

This partitioning

scheme was developed by Sonenblum et al.

(1975)3 .

Most

"purchasing" cities in the Deacon (1979) study contract

3In the Sonenblum et al. (1975) study, cities that
contract out less than 10 % of their budgeted outlays are
labeled self-provision (i.e., producing) cities, while
those that contract out more than 10 % of their budgeted
outlays are labeled contracting (i.e., purchasing) cities.

out more than 20 percent of their budgeted outlays,
while none of the "producing" cities contract out more
than 3 percent.
Deacon (1979) re-specifies a public expenditure
model based on the median voter theorem (Barr and Davis,
1966; Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; and Bergstrom and
Goodman, 1973) to allow for the possibility of
bureaucratic influences.

This is accomplished by

including a dichotomous variable where a value of 1
indicates a purchasing city.

Expenditure equations are

estimated for three cost categories: total expenditures,
police protection, and street maintenance.

The results

indicate that purchasing municipalities spend about 86
percent as much for total expenditures as their
producing counterparts.

Figures for police protection

and street maintenance are 58 percent and 70 percent
respectively (Deacon 1979, 388).
McGuire and Van Cott
In a study of the effects of public sector versus
private sector school bus operation, McGuire and Van
Cott (1984) find that private sector school bus
operation is less costly than public operation.

This

study is an extension of the prior research of Bails
(1979).

McGuire and Van Cott (1984) employ a different

data set to correct problems inherent in the data used
by Bails (1979).

Bails (1979) compares transportation costs at the
county level across six states.
into two groups:

The states are divided

(1 ) public sector ownership and (2 )

private sector ownership.

The problems inherent in this

classification scheme are twofold.

First, public

ownership exists in varying degrees in the states
classified as public, while private sector ownership
exists in varying degrees in the states classified as
private.

Second, public accounting procedures,

regulatory practices, climate, and topographical
conditions are not consistent across the states.

These

conditions introduce extraneous, confounding factors
into the analysis.
McGuire and Van Cott (1984) restrict their study to
the state of Indiana to avoid problems inherent in
interstate comparisons.

The data for the McGuire and

Van Cott (1984) study includes 275 school districts.

Of

these, 144 provide transportation with district-owned
(public) buses; 49 school districts use the services of
private sector contractors; and 82 districts use both
district-owned and contractor-owned buses.

Opportunity

costs, not available in the accounting records (e.g.,
foregone interest income associated with district
ownership, economic depreciation rather than accounting
depreciation, and registration fees implicit in district

ownership), are estimated and included in the cost of
providing transportation via district-owned buses.
McGuire and Van Cott (1984) find that the cost per
mile is higher for public bus systems in 12 of 15
comparisons.

In five of these comparisons the

difference is statistically significant.

The cost per

trip is higher for public bus systems in 11 of 15
comparisons.

In six of these comparisons the difference

is statistically significant.
Ferris
Ferris (1988) investigates the effects of local
service contracting on public spending and employment.
Ferris (1988) merges four sources of data:
(1)

Cross-sectional data from the 1982
International City Management Association
(ICMA) survey on local supply arrangements,

(2)

County and City Data Book of 1982,

(3)

The Annual Survey of Governments: Finance and
Employment Statistics 1981, and

(4)

Moodys' Municipal and Government Manual 1982.

A sample of 500 cities with populations of 25,000
or more is used in this study.

The results indicate

that as the percent of public services produced
externally increases, general expenditures, total
expenditures, and public employment all decrease.
results suggest that external (private sector)

These

production is less costly than internal (public sector)
production.
All of the above studies suggest that public sector
production is more costly than private sector
production.

Therefore, municipalities that do not

privatize RSC are spending more public resources than
would be spent if RSC was contracted out to a private
sector firm.

The present study investigates the

determinants of the decision to privatize RSC.
The Determinants of Privatization
This section reviews three studies that investigate
the determinants of privatization.

These studies

provide a foundation for the present study.

The present

study extends prior research by using public choice
theory and the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971) to
guide the selection of municipal accounting data useful
for modeling the municipal decision to privatize RSC.
Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries
Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries,

(1977) investigate

cities in Los Angeles county to determine why cities
contract out services, how contracting affects tax
rates, and how contracting and its effects on tax rates
affect the level and composition of expenditures.

In

their study, a sample of 72 cities in Los Angeles County
are partitioned into two groups based on the percentage

of budgeted outlays contracted out.

Municipalities are

labeled "self-provision "1 cities if they contract out
less than 10 percent of their city budget.
cities are considered self-provision cities.

Forty-four
The

remaining 28 cities contract out between 10 and 100
percent of their budgeted outlays and are labeled
"contracting cities."

The results suggest that

contracting cities have a smaller tax base and spend
less on municipal services than self-provision cities.
The researchers use a system of multiple regression
equations in which independent variables are entered in
a recursive fashion (Sonenblum et al. 1977, 117).

The

model uses a three stage process as follows:
Step
Step

I: Contracting =
(community
characteristics, tax bases)
II: Tax Rates = F 2 (community
characteristics, tax bases, contracting)

Step III: Expend = F 3 (community characteristics,
tax bases, contracting, tax rates)
The results of the Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries
(1977) study suggest that the extent of contracting out
is determined by trade-offs between the desire to:
maintain control over service delivery,

(1 )

(2 ) keep

expenditures low, and (3) minimize the tax burden on
property owners.

Specifically, the findings suggest

that the degree of contracting out increases as the
desire to maintain local control decreases.

However,

regardless of the preference for local control,

declining commercial sales within a municipality tend to
increase the degree of contracting out.

Therefore, the

tax base variable dominates the local control variable.
An increase in the incidence of contracting is also
associated with an increase in the property base per
capita and a decrease in family incomes.
Another conclusion of the Sonenblum, Kirlin and
Ries (1977) study is that contracting is associated with
lower property tax rates and lower property taxes per
capita.

However, contracting is also associated with

the use of special districts.

A special district is a

special purpose governmental unit set up to administer a
specific local function.

Special districts may be

independent special purpose governmental units created
under state law or they may be component units of
county, city, or other general governmental units (Hay
1989).

When special district tax rates are explicitly

considered, the overall average municipal service tax
rate of contracting cities is identical to that of selfprovision cities (Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries 1977, 132).
Therefore, when considering the effect of contracting on
property tax rates, it is important to account for the
use of special districts (and hence special district
taxes).

Failure to do so may result in the misleading

conclusion that contracting reduces the overall tax
burden of the citizen.

The conclusions of the Sonenblum, Kirlin and Ries
(1977) study must be interpreted with caution.
Specifically, the contracting, tax rate, and expenditure
variables are all endogenous.

Therefore, the estimation

procedure used yields unreliable (i.e., biased and
inconsistent) estimates.

A simultaneous-equation model

(e.g., three-stage least squares4 ) should be used to
take into account the codetermination of tax rates,
expenditures, and the propensity to contract out.
Ferris
Ferris (1986) examines the determinants of
privatization in cities across the United States.

This

study uses cross-sectional data from the 1982 ICMA
Survey of Alternative Approaches for Delivering
Services; the 1983 County and City Data Book; the Survey
of Governments: Finance Statistics, 1981; and the
Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations
Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism, 1982-83.
Because of the unavailability of data for cities with
populations of less than 25,000, a data set consisting
of 477 cities with populations of at least 25,000 is
used.

Three sets of factors are used to model the

decision to contract out:
4 See Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1981 Econometric Models
and Economic Forecasts New York: McGraw-Hill Company (pp.
334-338) for a discussion of the three-stage least squares
technique.
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. . . the potential for reducing the costs of
producing services, the fiscal pressures to reduce
the costs of producing services, and the political
inducements and obstacles to contracting out
(Ferris 1986, 291).
Specifically, Ferris (1986, 291) states that contracting
out is more likely as (1 ) potential cost savings
increase,

(2 ) the incentive to reduce costs increase,

and (3) political opposition to contracting becomes
weaker.

Based on this conceptual model, the following

equation is estimated:
CONTRACT = a + biSUPPLYi + bjFISCALj + bkPOLITICALk
where CONTRACT is the percentage of services provided by
the city that are produced externally; SUPPLY is a
vector of variables related to the costs of production
and the supply of external producers; FISCAL is a vector
of variables that characterize the fiscal environment of
the city; and POLITICAL is a vector of political forces
that influence the contracting out decision.
The results of the Ferris (1986) study suggest that
a city is more likely to privatize when private sector
salaries are lower than the salaries paid to city
employees.

Also, large cities are more likely to

privatize than small (population between 25,000 and
50,000) cities.

With respect to the political

variables, the results suggest that privatization is
less likely as:

(1 ) the percent of the population that

is 65 years of age or older increases,

(2) as the

percent of households with incomes of $30,000 or less
increases, and (3) as the number of city employees per
100 residents increases.

With respect to the fiscal variables, cities with
relatively high tax burdens contract out more often.
The evidence also suggests that as the percentage of
city revenues received from federal and state grants
increase, the percentage of services contracted out to
private sector firms increases.
the a priori expectation.

This result is opposite

Ferris (1986) notes that

reliance on intergovernmental revenues may be a proxy
for limited fiscal capacity since many grant programs
are based on community need.

Ferris (1986) also finds

that municipalities operating under an overall tax rate
limit are more likely to privatize.
variables are significant.

All fiscal

Therefore, variables

regarding the financial status of a municipality are
important in modeling the municipal decision to
privatize RSC.
McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott
Using cross-sectional data from the 50 states and
the District of Columbia for the 1979-80 school year,
McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott,

(1987) investigate why

some governmental units choose to provide public
services with publicly owned and operated production

units, whereas other governmental units choose to
provide the same service via contracts with private
sector firms.

Niskanen's (1971) theory of bureaucracy

is employed to develop a model of the decision to
contract out school bus transportation in the United
States.

Niskanen's (1971) theory views bureaucratic

decisions as a function of a bureaucrat's attempt to
maximize personal utility.

The results of the McGuire,

Ohsfeldt and Van Cott (1987) study support the theory
that bureaucrats behave as utility maximizers.
McGuire, Ohsfeldt and Van Cott (1987) conclude that
contracting with private sector firms is more attractive
as (1 ) the degree of labor unionization in the public
sector increases relative to the private sector,

(2 )

strike activity in the public sector increases relative
to the private sector, and (3) public sector wage rates
increase relative to private-sector wage rates.
A bureaucrat behaving as a utility maximizer will
opt for the mode of service delivery that is less
problematic.

Unionization and strike activity are two

issues that a utility maximizing bureaucrat tries to
avoid.

Therefore, as unionization and strike activity

in the public sector increase, a utility maximizing
bureaucrat is more likely to use privatization as a
method of avoiding these issues.

The third conclusion

is less consistent with Niskanen's (1971) theory.

Budget maximizing bureaucrats are not necessarily
concerned with the fact that private sector wages are
lower than public sector wages.

However, elected

officials desiring to remain in office are concerned
with the perception of excessive waste in government.
If public sector wages are relatively higher than
private sector wages, some voter groups may pressure
elected officials to be more efficient.

Elected

officials must then respond by either (1 ) reducing
public sector employee wages or (2 ) privatizing services
to take advantage of the lower costs of production in
the private sector.
The theory of bureaucracy guides the McGuire,
Ohsfeldt and Van Cott (1987) study.

However, the

variables are primarily of a socioeconomic nature.

The

present study employs both public choice theory and the
theory of bureaucracy to suggest independent variables
of a financial nature to model the municipal decision to
privatize RSC.
Public Choice Theory
The decision to privatize public services is a
public resource allocation decision.

Two institutional

arrangements dominate democratic societies for making
such decisions:

(1 ) direct democracy and (2 )

representative democracy.

A direct democracy is one in

which all citizens vote on all issues concerning public

resource allocation.

However, larger societies are, of

necessity, representative democracies.

In a

representative democracy, citizens elect representatives
to public office.

These representatives (public

officials) are endowed with the authority to make
decisions for their constituents.

Because public

officials depend on their constituents for election and
re-election, they support legislation that will generate
the votes necessary for election and re-election (Downs
1957).

Therefore, theoretically, representative

democracy results in public resource allocation
decisions that are in the best interest of the
citizenry.

However, representative democracy does not

always result in public resource allocation decisions
that are in the best interest of its citizens.

In

regard to this point Holcombe (1985, 4) states:
In the U.S. case, at least, it appears that the
governmental form was freely chosen by its
citizens, and the theoretical challenge is to
explain how a government freely chosen by its
citizens can act in a way that is not in the best
interest of those citizens. Apart from any
connection with historical reality, any meaningful
theory of government that shows that the government
can act against the best interests of its citizens
must rest on a foundation theory that the offending
institution could have been chosen voluntarily by
the governed citizens.
It is of relatively little
importance to point out that a government imposed
upon people could work against those people's best
interest.
Of far more significance are the cases
where governments voluntarily chosen by people can
work against their interests.
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The dominant theory in the economics literature
regarding public sector decision making is public choice
theory.

Public choice theory uses the tools and

analytical methods of economics to study the
governmental sector, politics, and the public economy
(Buchanan 1984, 13).

In defining public choice theory,

Buchanan (1984, 13) states:
As with economic theory, the analysis attempts to
relate the behavior of persons in their various
capacities as voters, as candidates for office, as
elected representatives, as leaders or members of
political parties, as bureaucrats (all of these are
"public choice" roles) to the composite of outcomes
that we observe or might observe.
Public choice
theory attempts to offer an understanding, an
explanation, of the complex institutional
interactions that go on within the political
sector.
To study public resource allocation decisions, a
model of governmental decision making is necessary.

The

median voter model (Hotelling 1929; Bowen 1943; Downs
1957) is the dominant theoretical model used to
investigate the determinants of public resource
allocation decisions.

The median voter model holds that

in a democratic setting public resource allocation
decisions coincide with those preferred by the voter
having the median preference.

Since politicians in a

representative government, such as the United States,
require a majority of the votes to get elected to
office, they tend to propose a political platform that
appeals to the majority of voters.

To be re-elected, a

politician must, while in office, institute policies
that appeal to a majority of the voters.

Therefore, the

median voter is decisive in election outcomes (Downs
1957).
Another area of public choice theory attempts to
explain the public resource allocation decisions of
bureaucrats.

A bureaucrat is ". . . the senior official

of any bureau with a separate identifiable budget"
(Niskanen 1971, 22).

A bureaucrat is an official

working within a government's bureaucracy who is not
necessarily concerned with generating votes in order to
remain in office.

Because a bureaucrat does not need to

generate votes to remain in office, it is not necessary
for him or her to be concerned with the efficiency of
the governmental unit.

In other words, bureaucrats are

not necessarily motivated to implement policies that are
in the best interest of society.
If a bureaucrat is not compelled to select policies
that are in the best interest of society, what types of
policies are bureaucrats likely to implement?

To answer

this question one must consider the factors that drive
bureaucratic decisions.

According to Niskanen (1971), a

bureaucrat is driven to maximize personal utility.

In

Niskanens' view, one of the arguments in a bureaucrat's
utility function is the size of his or her budget.
Accordingly, bureaucrats seek to maximize their budgets.

In his book, Bureaucracy and Representative
Government. Niskanen (1971) develops a theory of
bureaucracy.

He argues that government tends to produce

an output level that is greater than the optimal level.
One of the basic tenants of this theory is that
bureaucrats are motivated by self-interest.

The theory

of bureaucracy suggests that when a bureaucrat decides
to privatize a municipal service, it is done because
this decision increases personal utility in some way.
Similarly, when a bureaucrat decides not to privatize a
municipal service, this decision also increases personal
utility in some way.

Therefore, a model of the decision

to privatize RSC must utilize variables that capture the
arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function.

Since

these arguments are unknown, the present study uses the
theory of bureaucracy to guide the selection of
independent variables that impact a bureaucrat's
decision to privatize RSC.
Bureaucrats serve politicians.

Therefore, the

actions of bureaucrats are constrained by the
politicians and voters they serve.

In accordance with

the work of Downs (1957) the present study assumes that
politicians are vote maximizers and voters are
rationally ignorant.

Voter ignorance of political

issues is rational because of the cost of becoming
informed (Downs 1957).

Becoming informed is very costly

on an individual level.

The phenomenon of rational

ignorance provides a range of voter indifference in
which voters are apathetic regarding the political
process.

Within this range of indifference bureaucrats

may act as utility maximizers and disregard the best
interests of the citizenry.

However, outside of this

range of indifference voters are motivated to take
political action.

Two issues that tend to mobilize

voters into action are (1 ) tax increases above some
threshold level and (2 ) the perception of excessive
government waste.

The results of a study by Ingram and

Copeland (1981) suggest that municipal accounting data
may be useful in explaining voter behavior.

In their

study, Ingram and Copeland (1981) use municipal
accounting information to predict the outcome of
elections for mayor in 113 cities with populations
greater than 25,000.

According to Ingram and Copeland

(1981, 840) municipal accounting data and socio
demographic data provide information that may be useful
in predicting mayoral election results.

The Ingram and

Copeland (1981) study provides some evidence that
municipal accounting data reflects policies implemented
by politicians.

Furthermore, municipal accounting data

appears to impound information that is used in voting
decisions.

Determinants of Accounting Choice
Models based on the cumulative logistic probability
function (logit) and the cumulative normal probability
function (probit) are used extensively by accounting
researchers to investigate the determinants of
accounting choice.

Logit and probit overcome problems

associated with ordinary least squares regression when
the dependent variable is dichotomous.

This section

reviews several accounting studies that employ logit or
probit.
Senteney and Strawser
Senteney and Strawser (1990) investigate the
association between financial statement effects and the
early adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting
Standard No. 87 (SFAS 87).

A cross-sectional logit

model is employed to assess the simultaneous impact of
five independent variables on the early adoption
decision.

The dependent variable in the logit model

assumes the value of 1 if a firm elects early adoption
of SFAS 87 and 0 if the firm does not elect early
adoption.

The results indicate that the ratio of

accumulated benefit obligation to fair value of plan
assets is significant regarding the early adoption of
SFAS 87 (p = 0.05).

The ratio of total debt to total

equity is only marginally significant (p = 0.15).
remaining three variables are not significantly

The

different from zero.

The overall logit model only

exhibits marginal significance.

Therefore, in general,

the independent variables in this study do not explain
management's decision to adopt SFAS 87 prior to the
implementation date (Senteney and Strawser 1990).
Elliott et al.
Elliott et al.

(1984) use logit to identify

characteristics of firms that elect to capitalize
research and development (R&D) costs prior to Statement
of Financial Accounting Standard No. 2 which requires
companies to expense R&D outlays in the year incurred.
The model uses 75 capitalizing and 560 expensing firms
having average R&D/Sales ratios greater than one percent
during the period 1974-76 (Elliott et al. 1984, 94).
The findings indicate that capitalizing firms tend to
have both negative retained earnings and highly variable
R&D expenditures over time.
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey
Bowen, Noreen and Lacey (1981) use probit to study
the determinants of the decision to capitalize interest.
The dependent variable in this study represents the
method of accounting for interest costs that are related
to expenditures on assets not yet in service.

The two

allowable methods prior to SEC Accounting Series Release
No. 163 in 1974, are (1) expensing interest costs and

(2)

capitalizing interest costs.

is therefore dichotomous.
include:

The dependent variable

Independent variables

(1 ) the existence of a management compensation

plan explicitly tied to reported earnings (a dummy
variable),

(2) a dividend constraint dummy variable,

interest coverage ratio,
firm size.

(3)

(4) leverage ratio, and (5)

According to the results of the probit

model, debt covenant variables significantly influence
the corporate decision to capitalize interest.
Hagerman and Zmijewski
Hagerman and Zmijewski (1979) use probit to study
the determinants of accounting policy choices.

The data

consists of a cross-sectional sample of 300 firms that
disclose their choice of accounting methods in their
1975 annual and/or SEC 10-K reports.
policy choices are investigated:

Four accounting

(1 ) inventory method—

LIFO vs. FIFO,

(2) depreciation method— accelerated vs.

straight line,

(3) treatment of the investment tax

credit— flow-through vs. deferral, and (4) amortization
period of past service pension costs— less than 30 years
vs. 30 years or more.
The dependent variable is the effect (i.e.,
increasing or decreasing) of the policy choice on net
income.

The dependent variable is therefore

dichotomous.
variables:

The model includes six independent

(1 ) firm size— sales and total assets,

(2 )

capital intensity— the ratio of gross fixed assets to
sales,

(3) concentration ratio— the percentage of sales

accounted for by the eight largest firms in each four
digit standard industrial code category in the sample,
(4)

the existence of a profit sharing plan (dummy

variable), (5) risk— the beta of the firm, and (6) the
effective tax rate (used only in the inventory choice
models to control for the tax effects of the choice
between FIFO and LIFO).

The models for depreciation

method choice and inventory method choice are
statistically significant.
The above studies illustrate the use of logit and
probit to investigate the determinants of policy choice
decisions when the dependent variable is dichotomous.

A

dichotomous dependent variable causes the error term in
an ordinary least squares regression to be
heteroscedastic (Hagerman and Zmijewski 1979, 149-150).
Therefore, ordinary least squares parameter estimates
are unbiased but inefficient, making the usual tests of
statistical inference inappropriate.

Probit and logit

are techniques specifically designed for qualitative
(i.e., dichotomous) dependent variables, such as the
decision to privatize RSC.
Summary
This chapter presents a review of the literature
relevant to the present study.

The first section

reviews studies regarding the efficiency of private
sector versus public sector production.

The main

conclusion of this line of literature is that private
sector production is less costly than public sector
production.

The second section discusses studies that

investigate the determinants of the decision to
privatize public services.

These studies suggest that

the decision to privatize municipal services is
influenced by the interaction of voters, politicians,
and bureaucrats.

The third section presents public

choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy as the
theoretical foundation for constructing a model of the
decision to privatize RSC.

Finally, the fourth section

reviews studies that use logit and probit to illustrate
the use of these statistical technigues in accounting
choice research.

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter formally presents the theoretical
framework employed in this study.

The framework

synthesizes two theories that dominate the economic
literature regarding the allocation of public resources:
(1) Niskanen's (1971) theory of bureaucracy and (2)
public choice theory.

The decision to privatize a

service financed by government is a public resource
allocation decision.

Public choice theory and the

theory of bureaucracy provide the foundation for a
comprehensive theoretical framework useful for analyzing
public resource allocation decisions resulting from the
interaction of voters, politicians, and bureaucrats.
The first section of this chapter presents the
theory of bureaucracy as advanced by Niskanen (1971).
Public choice theory is the subject of the second
section.

The third section synthesizes the theory of

bureaucracy and public choice theory into a unified
theoretical framework.

The fourth section describes the

linkage between municipal accounting data, public choice
theory, and the theory of bureaucracy.
concludes with a brief summary.
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The chapter

The Theory of Bureaucracy
In his book, Bureaucracy and Representative
Government. Niskanen (1971) develops an economic theory
of bureaucracy behavior.

One of the basic tenants of

this theory is that a bureaucrat is motivated by selfinterest.
maximizer.

That is,

a bureaucrat is a utility

This tenant implies that the criteria for

deciding among alternatives will emphasize the effect of
a decision upon the bureaucrat rather than the
organization.

Clearly, a model of bureaucratic decision

processes must then utilize variables that capture the
arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function.
Niskanen's (1971) theory of bureaucracy provides insight
into the arguments of a bureaucrat's utility function.
According to Niskanen (1971), a bureaucrat is an
official working in the public sector who does not
depend on votes to remain in office.

Because

bureaucrats do not depend upon votes, it is not
necessary for them to be very concerned with the impact
of their decisions on voters.

This implies that a

bureaucrat is not necessarily motivated to implement
policies consistent with voter desires.

In Niskanens'

(1971) view, a bureaucrat makes decisions that enhance
his or her personal utility.

According to Niskanen

(1971, 38) the utility of a bureaucrat is a function of
salary, prestige, power, patronage, output of the

bureau, and perquisites of office.

All of which " . . .

are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of
the bureau during the bureaucrat’s tenure in office"
(Niskanen 1971, 38).

Accordingly, a bureaucrat seeks to

maximize the size of his or her budget.

The remainder

of this section provides a graphical presentation of the
basic bureaucracy model (Niskanen 1971, 1-52).
The Budget-Output Function
Niskanen (1971, 15) defines a bureau as an
organization with two distinguishing characteristics:
(1 ) the owners and employees are unable to capture any
of the difference between revenues and costs as personal
income, and (2 ) some part of the recurring revenues
derive from sources other than the sale of
per-unit price.

output at a

A sponsor organization typically grants

a budget to a bureau, and cost efficiency is typically
not a concern of the head of abureau.
In the present study, the sponsor organization is
the city council.

The maximum budget that the city

council (i.e., sponsor) awards a bureau depends upon the
expected output of the bureau.

Figure 3-1 illustrates a

sponsor organization's demand for the output of a
bureau.

The downward sloping demand curve conveys the

notion that the sponsor derives less value from each
additional unit of output G by the bureau.

The value of

an additional unit of output to the sponsor (i.e., the
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V
Total value of

v(G)dG

V=v(G)

Fig. 3-1.

Demand for G by sponsor organization

marginal value) is given by: V = v(G).
The area under the demand curve up to G 0 ,

fG0
v(G)dG,
0

represents the total value of Gq units of G to the
sponsor.

This area, therefore, is the maximum budget

that the sponsor will award for G 0 units of output G,
the maximum the sponsor will pay to obtain the quantity
Gq*

Since the sponsor values each additional unit of G
less, the size of the budget that a sponsor awards to a
bureau will increase at a decreasing rate as the amount
of G increases.

Figure 3-2 illustrates the relationship

between the amount of output G expected from a bureau
and the size of the budget awarded by the sponsor.

This

relationship is referred to as the budget-output
function and is given by:
B = b (G)
The budget-output function represents the total value of
various amounts of G to the sponsor (i.e., the maximum
budget that will be awarded at different levels of G ) .
The maximum budget to be awarded at G q amount of G is:

rG0
Bq =

v(G)dG
0

The Cost-Output Function
The minimum cost of producing output by a bureau
can be expressed in a cost-output function, which shows
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B=b(G)

Fig. 3-2.

The budget-output function
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the total costs of producing various levels of output.
That is, total production costs C are a function of the
amount of output G produced (i.e., C = c(G)).

The cost-

output function in Figure 3-3 assumes that fixed costs
for the bureau are zero, but this can be easily
generalized to fixed costs being positive5 .

The cost-

output function is also assumed to increase at a
constant rate6 .

Therefore, the marginal cost function

is a horizontal line (i.e., zero slope) as in Figure 34.
Since the operation of a bureau is dependent upon
funding from its sponsor, the sponsor must award a
budget that is greater than or equal to the total cost
of producing output G.

Consequently, a bureau will

continue to operate, if and only if, B > C.

5Fixed costs (FC) are zero in the long run, (since all
cost are variable in the long run) but in the short-run we
would expect FC > 0.
6In general, as production increases, fixed factors
constrain the production process thus causing an increasing
marginal cost of variable factors of production.
A costoutput function exhibiting increasing marginal costs
captures the diminishing marginal productivity of variable
factors in the short-run; however, this is not essential to
the analysis.
Steadily increasing marginal costs of output
in conjunction with a positive (or zero) fixed cost
component simply implies that unit costs increase as output
increases.
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C=c(G)

G

Fig.

3-3.

The cost-output function

MC_

Fig.

3-4.

dC
dG

The Marginal cost function

Bureaucratic Equilibrium
Given that a bureau only operates when B > C, the
upper and lower bounds of bureau output G may be shown
by graphing a budget-output
function on the same

graph.

function and a cost-output
Figures 3-5a and 3- 6 a

illustrate the equilibrium level of bureau output under
two different assumptions.
In Figure 3-5a output level
output that a bureau will supply.

is the maximum
Beyond G^ the size of

the budget a sponsor organization will award a bureau
will start to decrease.
constrained” maximum.
3-5b.

Point G^ is the "demandThis phenomenon is seen in Figure

Recall that V is the value of each additional

unit of G.

Unit G^ provides zero value to the sponsor.

Units of G beyond G^

have a negative "value” to the

sponsor.

the bureau must pay the sponsor to

In theory,

accept additional units of G beyond G^ (i.e., reduce the
size of the bureau's budget). The amount of G actually
supplied will be somewhere between zero and G^.
According to the theory of bureaucracy (Niskanen 1971),
a bureaucrat prefers to supply G^ because this output
level provides the largest budget.
The budget-output function represents the maximum
budget a sponsor is willing to award for various levels
of output G.

The cost-output function represents the

minimum cost of producing various levels of output G.

B=b(G)

C-c(G)

G

(a)

V ,MC

(b)

Fig. 3-5.

Demand constrained equilibrium

Fig. 3-6.

Budget constrained equilibrium
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Therefore, the bureau in Figure 3-5a is not motivated to
be efficient because B > C at all levels of G within the
relevant range (i.e., 0 < G < G^)7 .
> C

A situation where B

is very likely since a bureau generally will not

reveal its true minimum operating cost to its sponsor.
A bureaucrat may exploit this information asymmetry.
Since a sponsor organization is unable to directly
monitor a bureau (i.e., know minimum production costs),
the sponsor is in the position of having to award a
budget based on past bureau behavior.

Therefore, a

budget maximizing bureaucrat has no incentive to
minimize costs since the size of his or her budget will
to some extent be based on past expenditure levels.
This information asymmetry allows a bureau to operate in
an inefficient manner.

In fact, according to Niskanen

(1971, 48) ". . . it [a bureau] should be expected to
seek out expenditures beyond those minimally required in
order to exhaust the approved budget."
From society's viewpoint the optimal level of
output in Figure 3-5b is G2 .

At G2 the cost of

producing an additional unit of G is just equal to the

E f f i c i e n c y here refers to the minimizing of costs.
Later in the text reference is made to social efficiency.
Social efficiency refers to supplying the optimal amount of
a good from the viewpoint of society.
The socially optimal
level of G is that level where the benefit derived from an
additional unit of G is just equal to the additional (i.e.,
marginal) cost incurred (i.e., social marginal benefits
equal social marginal costs).

additional benefits derived from that unit.

That is, at

G 2 the social marginal benefits (SMB) are equal to the
social marginal costs (SMC).

The point at which SMB

equal SMC is the socially optimal (efficient) level of
production of G.
Figure 3-6 illustrates a situation in which the
cost-output function intersects the budget-output
function at a level of G that is lower than G ^

Since

total costs at Gl are greater than the maximum amount of
budget the sponsor organization is willing to provide at
Gl, the equilibrium output is less than G^.

The

socially optimal level of G is G4 , since this is the
point at which SMB equal SMC.

However, a

budget

maximizing bureaucrat prefers to supply G in the amount
of G 3 since this is where his or her budget is maximized
subject to the constraint that B > C.

Because of this

budget constraint, G 3 is referred to as the "budget
constrained" maximum.

Note that if the bureau in Figure

3-6 is operating at G 3 it is efficient (i.e., minimizing
costs).

However, it is not socially efficient (i.e.,

operating where SMB = SMC).
Figures 3-5 and 3-6 illustrate that a budget
maximizing bureaucrat tends to supply more output than
is socially optimal.

Since expenditures are a positive

monotonic function of bureau output, a bureau tends

toward expenditure levels that are greater than the
social optima.
Public Choice Theory
Public choice theory is an economic theory of how
governments allocate public resources.

The means by

which public resource are allocated is the political, or
voting, process.

Consequently, voter preferences are

the starting point for understanding public resource
allocation decisions.

The dominant framework for

studying the impact of voters on public resource
allocation is the median voter model.
The Median Voter Model
The median voter model (Bowen 1943; Downs 1957)
assumes that preferences are single-peaked (Black 1987).
Figure 3-7 illustrates the preferences curves of three
voters; however, this analysis can be easily generalized
to any number of voters.

Single-peakedness refers to

the notion that each person has some preferred level of
government output G.

Each person prefers a level of

output closer to his or her peak over levels further
away (Boadway and Wildasin 1984, 146).

In Figure 3-7,

persons A, B, and C will all vote to increase the level
of G from 0 to GA since this is closer to their
respective peaks.

Voters B and C will vote to increase

the level of G from GA to GB , while voter A will vote

Ordering
of
Preferences

against such a proposal.

In a simple majority rule

election, the increase from
to one margin.
from G B to

Gq

to Gq will win by a two

A proposition to increase the level of G
will receive support from voter C but not

voters A and B, thus the proposition will be defeated.
If preferences are single-peaked, it is clear that the
majority of voters prefer the level of G corresponding
to the level preferred by the median voter.
Figure 3-8 illustrates the demand for G by voters
A, B, and C.
sloping.

Note that the demand curves are downward

This represents the notion that each voter

values each additional unit of G less than the previous
unit.

The marginal cost (MC) divided by the number of

voters (N) represents the tax price to each voter A, B,
and C.

Note that each voter prefers a different level

of G at a given tax price.

Recall that a demand curve

illustrates the total value of each unit to the
individual.

In the case of Figure 3-8, the individual

demand curves represent the marginal value of each
additional unit of G to voter A, B, and C respectively.
The most preferred level of G for each person is the
level at which the marginal value of an additional unit
of G equals the marginal cost of obtaining an additional
unit of G.

This point corresponds to the peak of each

voter's preference curve (see Figure 3-7).

$/Unit

Most empirical tests of the median voter model
regress expenditure levels for a community on
socioeconomic variables that represent the median voter
of the community (e.g., median income).

The predictive

accuracy of the median voter model is assessed by
evaluating the statistical significance of the
coefficients in the regression equation.

Inman (1978)

tests the median voter hypothesis in a study of 58 Long
Island school districts using a majority rule referendum
for budget approval.
voter hypothesis .8

His results support the median
Figure 3-9 illustrates the

relationship between voters and public resource
allocation decisions in a direct democracy.

Assuming

single-peaked preference curves and a simple
majority rule election, public resource allocation
decisions will match the preferences of the median
voter.

Municipal financial records should reflect these

public resource allocation decisions.
Voter Utility
Voters derive utility from the consumption of
public goods (G) and private goods (X).

However, voters

are constrained in the amounts of G and X they can
consume by personal income (I).

If we assume p to be

8Many studies empirically test the median voter
hypothesis.
See for example, Barr and Davis 1966;
Borcherding and Deacon 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman 1973;
Pommerehne 1978; and Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982.

RESOURCE
VOTERS
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DECISION

MUNICIPAL
ACCOUNTING
DATA

Fig. 3-9.

Direct democracy model

C\

o\

the price of X and t to represent the tax paid per unit
of public good G, a constrained maximization problem can
be stated as follows:
MAX Uv = u(G, X)
s.t. I = tG + pX
Figure 3-10 illustrates that a voter will prefer a
combination of G and X in the amounts of G q and X q when
the tax price

per unit is tj_,.

preferred because

This combination

it puts him or her on

is

thehighest

indifference curve possible subject to his or her budget
constraint.

Recall that an indifference curve

represents the amount of utility derived for various
combinations of G and X.

All points on an indifference

curve provide the same utility to the individual.

A

higher indifference curve, such as U q , represents a
greater degree of utility than a lower indifference
curve, such as l^.

The most preferred combination of G

and X is the point at which an
indifference curve is just tangent to the budget line.
In Figure 3-10, the combination G q and X q is most
preferred at tax price t^.
If the tax price per unit is increased from t! to
t 2 the budget line will rotate clockwise pivoting at
I/p.

Now the most preferred combination is G 0 and Xj.

The increased tax price means that the voter will prefer
the same amount of G as before, however, he will only be

Fig. 3-10.
tax prices.

Preferred combination of G and X at different

able to purchase X ^ of other goods.

The increased tax

price results in a lower level of utility for the voter.
This lower utility level is shown by the indifference
curve labeled Uj_.

Since

is lower than U 0 , the voter

derives less overall utility from the combination G 0 ,
than from combination G 0 , X 0 .
Representative Democracy
The two dominant institutional arrangements for
making public resource allocation decisions in a
democratic society are (1 ) direct democracy and (2 )
representative democracy.

A direct democracy is one in

which all citizens vote on all issues concerning public
resource allocation via referendum.

However, larger

societies are, of necessity, representative democracies.
In a representative democracy, citizens elect
representatives to public office.

These representatives

(public officials) are endowed with the authority to
make decisions for their constituents.

Downs (1957)

explicitly incorporates representative democracy into
the analysis of public sector decision making.

Because

public officials depend upon their constituents for
election and re-election, they support legislation
designed to generate the votes necessary for election
and re-election (Downs 1957).

In a simple majority rule

election, a politician who is a member of a two-party
system, will propose a political platform designed to

appeal to the majority of the voters (Downs 1957).

More

specifically, a politician seeks the support of at least
one-half plus one of the voters.

In other words, the

median voter is the decisive vote.

Therefore in a

representative democracy, just as in a direct democracy,
public resource allocation decisions coincide with the
preferences of the median voter.
According to Downs (1957), politicians are utility
maximizers who derive utility from holding elective
office.
votes.

Therefore, a politician attempts to maximize
A politicians objective function can be

expressed as:
Max Up = u(votes)
In a two-party system a politician seeking to maximize
his or her appeal to the majority of voters will support
a political platform that is similar to the preferences
of the median voter (Downs 1957).

Figure 3-11

illustrates a situation in which the political
ideological preferences of voters are single-peaked.
Under this assumption a politician attempting to
maximize votes will take a position that is near the
center of the political spectrum.

A politician running

on an extremely liberal (conservative) platform stands
little chance to win an election since his or her appeal
is limited.

Number
of
Voters

Rent Seeking
The above discussion implicitly assumes that voters
are politically active.
politically active.

However, not all voters are

Some voters are ignorant of

political issues (Downs 1957).

A person may be ignorant

of political issues for a variety of reasons.

One

reason is the high cost of becoming an informed voter.
Since the probability of a single voter making a
difference in the outcome of an election is small, the
benefit derived from becoming informed and casting a
vote is insignificant to many people (Downs 1957).

From

a cost-benefit point of view, it is rational to be
ignorant of political issues and to forego voting.

Such

political ignorance is referred to as "rational
ignorance"

(Downs 1957).

It is less costly for people with a common purpose
to form interest groups because the group can share the
work of becoming informed.

The probability of receiving

the benefits of becoming informed is increased for
interest groups since the group can cast a block of
votes.

This block of votes compose a larger percentage

of the total votes than a single vote.
The potential to influence the outcome of an
election makes interest groups very important to
politicians.

These interest groups (i.e., lobbyist)

lobby legislators to support their cause.

On the other

hand, politicians seeking office attempt to generate the
support of large interest groups by supporting the
agenda of the interest group.

The actions of the

lobbyist are referred to as "rent seeking"
1967).

(Tullock

Rent seeking is a wasteful activity from

society's viewpoint because it does not increase output.
Rather, it simply redistributes who gets the money
associated with creating existing output (Varian 1987,
398).

One rent seeking interest group in the present

study is public employees.

Public employees are a very

active interest group and can, therefore, find support
among politicians.

This suggests that public employees

may lobby local politicians to forgo privatization of
RSC.

This aversion to privatization is expected because

public employees stand to lose the most (their
employment)

from privatization.

The relationship between voters, politicians, and
public resource allocation decisions is depicted in
Figure 3-12.

The model in Figure 3-12 illustrates that

politicians make public resource decisions for voters.
Since politicians depend on voters to get elected or re
elected, public resource allocation decisions reflect
the will of the voters.

More specifically,

in a simple

majority rule voting model the median voter's
preferences prevail in resource allocation decisions.
Therefore, even with politicians in the model, public

RESOURCE
VOTERS

POLITICIANS

ALLOCATION
DECISION

MUNICIPAL
ACCOUNTING
DATA

Fig. 3-12.

Representative democracy model
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resource allocation decisions correspond to those
preferred by the median voter.
Public Choice, Bureaucracy Theory
and the Decision to Privatize
This section presents a theoretical framework to
explain the impact of voters, politicians, and
bureaucrats on the municipal decision to privatize RSC.
The voter model is combined with the bureaucracy model
to provide a unified theory of the privatization
decision.

In this development, bureaucrats are utility

maximizers in accordance with Niskanen's theory of
bureaucracy (1971), politicians and voters are vote
maximizers and rationally ignorant respectively in
accordance with Downs (1957).

The "rational ignorance"

of voters is generally attributed to the notion that the
costs associated with becoming an informed voter are
greater than the expected benefits.

If the benefits of

being informed exceed the associated costs, it is
beneficial for a voter to become informed and
politically active.
In Figure 3-13, budget line 1 (BL^) represents the
various combinations of RSC services (G) and all other
goods (X) that can be purchased by the median voter of a
community.

According to Figure 3-13, the optimal amount

of G for the median voter is G 4 .

This level of G puts

the median voter on the highest indifference curve
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BL

Fig. 3-13.

BL

Voter utility levels for various levels of G

possible (U4 ) given the budget constraint.

Any level

less than or more than G 4 puts this individual on a
lower indifference curve indicating less utility.

The

distance (M) between BL^ and BL 2 represents the median
voter's expected mobilization costs.

Mobilization costs

include the cost of gathering and processing information
(i.e., the costs of becoming informed).

If the voter

incurs these costs, his or her budget line shifts from
BL 3 to BI»2 because mobilization costs reduce net income
available for consumption.

At BL 2 this voter prefers a

level of G equal to G 3 since this puts him or her on the
highest possible indifference curve (U2 ) given the new
budget constraint BL2 .

Therefore, the expected level of

G from incurring mobilization costs, M, is G 3 .
It is only beneficial for the voter in Figure 3-13
to incur mobilization costs M when the level of G is
greater than G 6 or less than G 2 .

This cost-benefit

relationship is apparent after analyzing this voter's
utility level at various points on the graph.
that the level of G government provides is G 5 .
level this voter will be on U 3 .

Assume
At this

If mobilization costs M

are incurred, the expected level of G is G 3 resulting in
voter utility level U 2 .

This voter does not benefit by

incurring costs M since U 3 is higher than U 2 .

In other

w o rds, the loss in utility (U4 to U 3) from a change in
the level of G from the optimum level G 4 to a level of

G 5 does not justify incurring mobilization costs M,
which results in U 2 .

However, if G is set at a level

greater than Gg or less than G 2 this voter attains a
utility level that is lower than U 2 , making it
beneficial to incur costs M, which results in utility
level U 2 .
Levels of G between G 2 and Gg do not motivate this
individual to incur mobilization costs M.

The range

between G 2 and Gg is referred to as the "range of voter
indifference."

This range represents output levels

within which this voter remains "rationally ignorant."
Outside of the range of voter indifference, we expect
this voter to become politically active since the
expected gain in utility justifies incurring
mobilization costs M.
Figure 3-14 illustrates the supply side of the
model.

The cost-output function (C) represents the

minimum costs of providing various levels of G.
output function

Budget-

reflects a sponsor organization who

values G less than the sponsor organizations reflected
in B2 , B 3 and B4 .

A budget maximizing bureaucrat

working for the sponsor organization reflected in B^
will prefer to supply a level of G equal to Gi since
this provides the maximum budget subject to the
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Fig. 3-14.
Value of G to sponsors with differing budgetoutput functions.
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constraint that B X > C9 .

Similarly, a budget maximizing

bureaucrat working for the sponsor organization
reflected in B 4 will prefer to supply a level of G equal
to G 7 since this provides the maximum budget subject to
the constraint that the marginal value of an additional
unit must be greater than or equal to 0 10.
Assuming a budget maximizing bureaucrat, a level of
G equal to G^ in Figure 3-13 will most likely occur in
the budget constrained case (i.e.,

in Figure 3-14).

In this situation, privatization does not yield any
efficiencies since the bureau is operating at minimum
costs.

A private sector producer can not under-bid this

bureau since his or her minimum cost will equal that of
the bureau.
A relatively high level of G equal to G 7 in Figure
3-13 will most likely occur in demand constrained bureau
such as that illustrated by B 4 in Figure 3-14.

At this

level of G the bureau is not operating at minimum costs.
In fact, there is "slack" or "waste" (S) in this bureau
equal to the difference between the size of the budget
the sponsor is willing to award at that level of G and
the cost of production.

At this level of G

9Recall that this is the "budget constrained" maximum
discussed in section one of this chapter.
10Recall that this is the "demand constrained" maximum
discussed in section one of this chapter.

privatization does yield efficiencies.

A private sector

company bidding any amount greater than the minimum cost
of producing G 7 and less than the budget the sponsor is
willing to award at G 7 results in savings to the sponsor
and profit for the private sector producer.
Figure 3-15 depicts the relationship between the
level of G provided and the political activity of
voters.

Within the "range of voter indifference" voters

are not politically active.

However, when the level of

G is outside this range voters begin to put pressure on
politicians to adjust the level of G to within tolerable
limits.

Politicians in turn place pressure on

bureaucrats to bring the level of G back into the range
of voter indifference.
When the level of G is low and outside the range of
voter indifference, voters incur mobilization costs and
pressure politicians to increase the level of G (e.g.,
from G^ to G 2 in Figures 3-13 and 3-14) as the sponsor's
demand responds to voter demands.

The pressure on

politicians to increase the level of G implies an upward
shift in the budget-output function (e.g., from
in Figure 3-14).

to B2

Since the size of the budget the

sponsor organization is willing to provide at G 2 is
slightly greater than the minimum cost to produce G2 , a
private sector producer can provide some savings for the
sponsor.

However the savings are small.

Therefore, the
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Fig. 3-15.

Theoretical model

VOTERS

probability of privatization is greater at G 2 than at
— although not very high.
When the level of G is high and outside the range
of voter indifference, voters incur mobilization costs
and put pressure on politicians to decrease the level of
G (e.g., from G 7 to Gg in Figures 3-13 and 3-14).

The

demand for a reduction in the level of G implies a
downward shift of the budget-output function (e.g., from
B4 to B 3 in Figure 3-14).

Since the size of the budget

the sponsor is willing to award at Gg is substantially
greater than the minimum cost of producing Gg, a private
sector producer can provide substantial savings to the
sponsor organization.

The probability of privatization

is greatest at G7 , less at Gg, still less at G 2 and
approaches 0 at G^.
Municipal Accounting Data and
the Decision to Privatize
Public resource allocation decisions are the result
of a complex set of interactions between voters,
politicians, and bureaucrats.

The previous section

models this complex set of interactions by synthesizing
public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy.
This framework is used to model the municipal decision
to privatize RSC using municipal accounting data.
study by Ingram and Copeland (1981) suggests that
municipal accounting information may be useful in

A

explaining voter behavior.

In their study, municipal

accounting information is used to predict the outcome of
mayoral elections in 113 cities with populations greater
than 25,000.

Their results suggest that the combination

of municipal accounting data and socio-demographic data
may be useful in predicting election results (Ingram and
Copeland 1981, 840).

The Ingram and Copeland (1981)

study provides some empirical evidence that municipal
accounting data reflects the policies implemented by
politicians (via bureaucrats).

Furthermore, municipal

accounting information appears to impound information
used by voters in casting their votes.
The model constructed in the previous section
illustrates that voters only become politically active
when government output is outside the range of voter
indifference.

Two issues that tend to mobilize voters

to become politically active are (1 ) tax increases above
some threshold level and (2 ) the perception of excessive
government waste.

Each of these issues is discussed

below.
Figure 3-10 illustrates that an increase in taxes,
results in a decrease in voter utility.
voters are tax adverse.

Therefore,

Municipal accounting data can

measure the tax burden placed on voters.

As tax levels

increase voters become politically active and advocate
cost cutting measures.

The amount of total tax revenues

per household provides a measure of the tax burden upon
the voters of a community.

A priori, as the amount of

tax revenues per household increase, the probability of
privatization will increase.
Figure 3-14 shows that privatization produces
efficiencies when the budget of a bureau exceeds the
cost of production (i.e., when there is slack in the
budget).

As discussed in the previous section,

budgetary slack is more likely to occur at higher output
levels rather than lower levels.

RSC expenditures per

household can proxy for excessive government waste, or
slack.

Voters become politically active as the level of

government waste increases.

Therefore, as RSC

expenditures per household increase, the probability of
privatization increases.
According to the theoretical framework presented in
this chapter, bureaucrats, ceteris paribus, prefer
municipal RSC to contract RSC.

Prior research suggests

that municipal RSC is more costly than contract RSC
(Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; Stevens 1978; Bennett and
Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; Berenyi and Stevens 1988).
However, voters prefer the least costly method of RSC
since this decreases their tax burden.

Therefore,

bureaucrats can only act on their preference when voters
do not perceive that they are bearing the cost of the
more expensive municipal RSC.

While voters are aware

that they bear the cost of tax revenues available to
bureaucrats (e.g., local sales taxes), they are
generally unaware that they bear the cost of certain
non-tax revenue sources available to the bureaucrat
(e.g., general obligation bond proceeds).

General

obligation bonds are a source of revenue that allows a
governmental unit to shift payment for current
consumption into the future; for example, current levels
of G may be increased without a corresponding increase
in taxes.

Consequently, voters do not perceive the

costs associated with general obligation debt.
Therefore, as the amount of general obligation bonds
outstanding increase, the probability of privatization
will decrease.
Intergovernmental revenues are another source of
funds available to the bureaucrat.

If intergovernmental

revenues are an unrestricted source of funds, a
bureaucrat is able to increase the level of G without a
corresponding increase in taxes.

Since the tax price to

voters remains unchanged, they are indifferent to the
increased level of G (i.e., they are in the range of
indifference).

This allows a bureaucrat to continue to

use municipal RSC rather than contract RSC.

Therefore,

as intergovernmental revenues per household increase,
the probability of privatization decreases.

However, intergovernmental revenues may be awarded
on the basis of financial need.

If these revenues are a

proxy for financial need, the level of G cannot be
increased without a corresponding increase in taxes.

An

increase in taxes causes the level of voter utility to
decrease.

This in turn causes voters to put pressure on

politicians to reduce taxes.

Bureaucrats are then

pressured by politicians to reduce costs.

Privatization

is an attractive means of reducing costs.

Therefore, as

intergovernmental revenues per household increase, the
probability of privatization increases.

From the above

discussion, the effect of intergovernmental revenues on
the privatization decision is ambiguous and is tested
empirically.
The range of voter indifference is greater for
affluent communities.

This is because of the

opportunity costs of becoming informed (i.e.,
mobilization costs).

Becoming informed regarding

political issues is a time consuming process as is
voting.

This makes it more expensive for high income

individuals to become informed.

Therefore, bureaucrats

in affluent communities are less likely to privatize
RSC.

The average household's assessed valuation

multiplied by the property tax millage rate is a measure
of the property taxes paid by the average household in a
community.

This provides a measure of the wealth of a

community.

Wealthy communities are less likely to

privatize RSC.
Politicians are subject to pressure from special
interest or rent seeking, groups.

One special interest

group that is against privatization is public employees.
Public employees stand the most to lose (i.e., their
jobs) from privatization.

A priori, as municipal

employees as a percent of total population increase, the
probability of privatization decreases.
According to the theoretical framework in the
previous section, voters are more likely to become
politically active when the costs of becoming informed
are low.

The use of a user fee for RSC provides

information to voters at little or no cost.
makes the cost of RSC explicit to the voter.

A user fee
This

information allows voters to compare the cost of RSC in
their community to the cost in other communities.

Since

the cost of contract RSC is lower, voters are likely to
become politically active and pressure politicians to
privatize RSC (if not already privatized) when a user
fee is assessed.
Summary
This chapter presents the theoretical framework
used in this study.

The first section describes the

theory of bureaucracy as advanced by Niskanen (1971).
The second section discusses public choice theory.

The

third section synthesizes the theory of bureaucracy and
public choice theory into a unified theoretical
framework.

The fourth section describes the linkage

between municipal accounting data, public choice theory,
and the theory of bureaucracy.

CHAPTER 4
METHOD
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the
research method of this study.

The first section

presents the research question, this is followed by a
discussion of the research hypotheses in the second
section.

The third section presents the formal model,

while the fourth section describes the method of data
collection.

The fifth section describes the statistical

procedures used to analyze the data.

The chapter

concludes with a brief summary.
Research Question
The Governmental Accounting Standards Board
Concepts Statement No. 1, "Objectives of Financial
Reporting," states that a government's financial reports
should allow citizens to assess the accountability of
public officials (GASB 1987, 27).

This implies that

municipal accounting data should allow citizens to
evaluate public resource allocation decisions made by
public officials.

The purpose of this study is to

evaluate the extent to which municipal accounting data
is useful for modeling a specific public resource
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allocation decision: the decision to privatize RSC.

The

primary research question is:
Is municipal accounting data useful for modeling
the municipal decision to privatize RSC?
This study provides empirical evidence regarding whether
municipal accounting data provides information useful
for assessing the accountability of public officials— a
stated objective of GASB Concepts Statement No. 1.
Prior research suggests that contract RSC is less
costly than municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977;
Stevens 1978; Bennett and Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985;
Berenyi and Stevens 1988).

However, there are many

municipalities that do not use contract RSC.

Therefore,

minimizing costs does not appear to be a primary concern
of public sector decision makers (i.e., bureaucrats)
when deciding whether to privatize RSC.

The synthesis

of public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy
presented in the previous chapter provides a theoretical
framework for modeling public resource allocation
decisions resulting from the interaction of voters,
politicians, and bureaucrats.

Hypotheses derived from

public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy are
used to investigate the research question above.
Municipal accounting data is used to operationalize the
hypotheses.

Research Hypotheses
Given the general conclusion of prior research that
private sector production is less costly than public
sector production,

it is curious that public sector

production remains popular in so many municipalities.
One possible explanation for the persistence of public
sector production, when private sector alternatives
exit, is that public sector production increases the
size of the budget under the control of a bureaucrat.
According to Niskanen (1971, 38), the variables that
enter into a bureaucrat's utility function are a
positive monotonic function of the size of the budget
controlled by a bureaucrat.

Therefore, a larger budget

enhances the utility of a bureaucrat.

The increase in

utility may be in the form of the prestige that comes
from being a part of a large organization or the
increase in salary that comes with the additional
responsibilities associated with a larger span of
control.

In Niskanen*s (1971) view, bureaucrats are

motivated by their own self-interest, rather than the
interest of the citizenry.

Cost efficiency, therefore,

becomes a secondary objective in bureaucratic decision
making.

As discussed in the previous chapter, voters

constrain bureaucrats by putting pressure on
politicians. When expenditure levels increase beyond
some threshold level (i.e., force voters outside their

range of indifference), voters mobilize into action.
Voters then exert pressure upon politicians to reduce
government spending.

One method to reduce the level of

government expenditures is to provide services in a less
costly manner (e.g., privatization). This leads to the
following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):
:

Ceteris paribus, as total RSC expenditures per
household increase, the probability of
privatization will increase.

Tax revenues represent a significant proportion of
total municipal revenues.

For fiscal 1984-85 total

taxes accounted for 54.1% of Louisiana local government
total own-source revenues (Cohen 1988, 69).

Total tax

revenues per household represent the tax burden upon
voters.

If the tax burden increases above some

threshold level, voters become politically active (i.e.,
forced outside their range of indifference).

A

politician attempting to levy taxes higher than this
threshold level, will lose the support of the voters.
To avoid raising taxes beyond this threshold, a
politician will advocate aggressive cost cutting
measures.

One method to reduce costs is to use less

costly service delivery arrangements for public
services.
RSC.

One such arrangement is the privatization of

Stated in the alternative form, it is hypothesized

that:
H2 :

Ceteris paribus, as total tax revenues per

household increase, the probability of
privatization will increase.
A rational person will not take the time to become
informed (or to vote) unless the benefits outweigh the
associated costs (Downs 1957).

Therefore, the range of

voter indifference is greater in wealthy communities
because of the greater opportunity costs of becoming
informed and taking the time to vote.

These opportunity

costs make it possible for bureaucrats (and politicians)
to be less concerned with minimizing the cost of
services provided to residents (e.g., RSC).

Hence,

affluent communities are less likely to privatize RSC.
The average household's assessed valuation multiplied by
the property tax millage rate is a measure of the
property taxes paid by the average household in a
community.

This is a proxy for the wealth of a

community.

This leads to the following hypothesis

(stated in the alternative form):
H3 :

Ceteris paribus, as the amount of property
taxes paid by the average household increase,
the probability of privatization will
decrease.

General obligation bonds are long-term debt
instruments backed by the full faith and credit of the
issuing municipality.

General obligation debt provide a

means of financing current consumption with future tax
revenues.

Therefore, general obligation bond proceeds

represent an additional source of revenue available to

the bureaucrat.

These additional revenues make it

possible for a bureaucrat to engage in inefficient
activities (e.g., municipal RSC rather than contract
RSC).

This leads to the following hypothesis (stated in

the alternative form):
H4 :

Ceteris paribus, as the amount of general
obligation debt outstanding per household
increases, the probability of privatization
will decrease.

Voters and bureaucrats may view state and federal
grants as "free money."

This influx of free money

reduces the need for efficient government spending and
allows bureaucrats to keep RSC in the public domain.
However, eligibility for state and federal grants may be
based on financial need.

If this is the case, grant

monies are a proxy for fiscal crises.

A municipality

experiencing fiscal crises tends to aggressively pursue
less costly means of service delivery (e.g.,
privatization).

Both of these arguments are reasonable.

Theoretically, the level of intergovernmental revenues
received should impact on the decision to privatize RSC,
however, a priori, the direction of the relationship is
not definite.

This leads to the following hypothesis

(stated in the alternative form):
H5:

Ceteris paribus, the amount of
intergovernmental revenues per household will
impact on the decision to privatize RSC.

Politicians compete for votes.

According to the

median voter model, politicians advocate policies to

generate the support of the voter with the median
preference (Downs 1957).
politically active.

However, not all voters are

Many voters are "rationally

ignorant" of political issues (Downs 1957).

Being

ignorant of political issues is rational because of the
costs of becoming informed on an individual basis.

It

is cost efficient for groups of individuals with common
interests to form a coalition in order to spread the
cost of becoming informed across more individuals,
thereby decreasing the cost per individual.

These

coalitions or special interest groups disseminate
information to members and non-members to generate
support for their cause.

This gives a special interest

group substantial political clout.

Politicians tend to

support the causes of special interest groups because of
the vote power these groups possess.

Vote power refers

to the percentage of votes in an election that a group
of voters control (Borcherding, Bush, and Spann 1977).
One group of voters identified as having a
disproportionate effect on election results are public
employees (Bennett and Orzechowski 1983).

Public

employees have a vested interest in the privatization
decision (i.e., job security), therefore, they tend to
lobby against privatization.

According to Niskanen's

(1971) view of bureaucracy, budget maximizing
bureaucrats will support public employees in their quest

to retain RSC in the public domain.

Stated in the

alternative form, it is hypothesized that:
Hg:

Ceteris paribus, as the ratio of the number of
municipal employees (less RSC employees) to
total population increases, the probability of
privatization will decrease.

Another factor that may impact on the decision to
privatize RSC is service level.

Currently, measures of

outcome and efficiency of RSC services are not reported
on a regular basis (Rubin 1990, 265).

According to the

Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) service
efforts and accomplishments reporting project, the
frequency of RSC indicates the level of service provided
to residents and is readily available (Rubin 1990, 269).
Therefore, this study uses the frequency of RSC as a
proxy for service level.
Private sector employees operate in a competitive
environment.

The competitive environment makes it

necessary for a private sector firm to provide a high
level of services or face losing customers to the
competition.

Municipal employees operate from a

monopoly position.

The lack of competition in the

public sector makes it possible to provide a lower level
of service without the fear of losing customers to a
competitor.

This leads to the following hypothesis

(stated in the alternative form):
H7:

Ceteris paribus, as the frequency of RSC
increases, the probability of privatization
increases.
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When voters are the beneficiaries of many
governmental services financed by tax revenues they are
unable to determine the cost of each service separately.
However, when a user charge is assessed for a particular
service the cost of that service is made explicit.

This

puts the voter in a position to evaluate the costs and
benefits of the service.

Many studies suggest that

contract RSC is less costly than municipal R S C .11
Therefore, communities that assess a user fee are more
likely to privatize RSC.

This leads to the following

hypothesis;
Hg:

Municipalities that assess a user fee for RSC
are more likely to privatize RSC.

In Louisiana, New Orleans is the largest
metropolitan area and therefore may possess
characteristics that are different from other
municipalities in the state.

A dummy variable is

included in the model to capture any systematic
differences between municipalities in the New Orleans
area and those outside the New Orleans area.

One

characteristic of metropolitan areas is high population
density.

Metropolitan areas tend to have more people

per square mile than rural areas.

This puts a

13-Kitchen (1976), Savas (1977), Stevens (1978),
Bennett and Johnson (1979), McDavid (1985), and Berenyi &
Stevens (1988) all find contract RSC to be less costly than
municipal RSC.

tremendous strain on the ability of government to
provide services.

One means to alleviate this strain is

to contract out services to the private sector.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that:
H9:

Ceteris paribus, municipalities located in the
metropolitan New Orleans area are more likely
to privatize RSC.

The current study extends the existing literature
by developing a model of the decision to privatize RSC
using financial and demographic variables.

Prior

research typically uses socioeconomic independent
variables to model this decision.

One of the

limitations of socioeconomic data is its availability.
For example, some data available through the U.S. Census
Bureau is only published every five years.

Another

limitation of socioeconomic data is that it generally is
used as a proxy for the data actually used in the
decision to privatize public services.

The present

study combines internal municipal accounting data with
current demographic data to model the decision to
privatize RSC.

This data is more representative of the

type of data used in the privatization decision.

Table

4-1 provides a summary of the null hypotheses tested in
this study.

TABLE 4-1
SUMMARY OF NULL HYPOTHESES TESTED
H]_:

Ceteris paribus, RSC costs per household do not
affect the decision to privatize RSC.

H 2 : Ceteris paribus,
total tax revenues per household
do not affect the decision to privatize RSC.
H 3 : Ceteris paribus,
the amount of property taxes
generated by the average household does not affect
the decision to privatize RSC.
H4 :

Ceteris paribus, the amount of general obligation
bonded debt outstanding per household does not
affect the decision to privatize RSC.

H5 :

Ceteris paribus, the amount of intergovernmental
revenues per household do not affect the decision
to privatize RSC.

H6:

Ceteris paribus, the ratio of the number of
municipal employees (less RSC employees) to total
population does not affect the decision to
privatize RSC.

H 7 : Ceteris paribus, the frequency of RSC does not
affect the decision to privatize RSC.
H 8 : Ceteris paribus, the assessment of a RSC user fee
does not affect the decision to privatize RSC.
Hg:

Ceteris paribus, the geographic proximity of a
municipality to the metropolitan New Orleans area
does not affect the decision to privatize RSC.
The Model
Financial and demographic data operationalize the

hypotheses outlined above.

The dependent variable in

the model is the method of RSC.

This study investigates

two methods of RSC:
1.
employees, and

Municipal— where RSC is provided by municipal

2.

Contract— where RSC is provided by a private

sector firm under contract with a municipality.
The qualitative nature of the dependent variable in the
model creates certain statistical problems.

However,

techniques are available to handle these problems.
Probabalistic regression analysis (probit) and logistic
regression analysis (logit) are two statistical
techniques available for managing the problems
associated with a dichotomous dependent variable.

Logit

is based on a cumulative logistic probability function,
while probit is based on a cumulative normal
probability distribution.

These two models are very

similar:
The logistic and normal curves are so similar
as to yield essentially identical results.
In
practice they yield estimated choice probabilities
that differ by less than .02 and which can be
distinguished, in the sense of statistical
significance, only with very large samples.
The
choice between them, therefore, revolves around
practical concerns such as the availability and
flexibility of computer programs and personal
preferences and experience (Aldrich and Nelson
1984, 34).
Logit is used in this study.

A chi-square test is used

to evaluate the overall significance of the model as
well as the statistical significance of the individual
coefficients.

The alpha level used for determining

statistical significance in this study is .10.
following logit model is estimated:

The

METHOD = a + ^ R E F U S E + /32TAXREV + £3 PROPERTY + £ 4 DEBT +
j05GRANTS +

(35 PCTEMP

+ /?7FREQ + /SgUSERFEE + /SgNEWORL

where METHOD is a dichotomous variable that assumes the
value of 1 for contract RSC and 0 for municipal RSC.
The independent variables consist of municipal
accounting information obtained by means of a survey of
all Louisiana municipalities.

Table 4-2 presents,

for

each hypothesis tested, a brief description of the
relevant variable and the expected sign of its
coefficient.
Data Collection
The data for this study was obtained via a survey
of all Louisiana municipalities.

The survey instrument,

reproduced in Appendix A, ascertains the method of RSC,
the cost of providing RSC, and other data necessary for
the study.

The survey was mailed in three bulk mailings

each approximately one month apart.

In the first

mailing, a survey was sent to all 301 Louisiana
municipalities.

Municipalities not responding to the

first mailing within one month were sent a second
survey.

A third and final survey was sent out one month

after the second mailing to those municipalities not
responding to the first two mailings.

TABLE 4-2
HYPOTHESES, VARIABLE DEFINITIONS, AND
EXPECTED SIGN FOR COEFFICIENTS
HypoExpected
thesis_____________Independent Variable_______________ Sian
Hj:

REFUSE— total RSC expenditures per
household.

(+)

H2 :

TAXREV— total tax revenues collected
per household.

(+)

H3 :

PROPERTY— property tax rate times the
total assessed valuation per household.

(-)

H4 :

DEBT— general obligation bonds outstanding per household.

H5 :

GRANTS— intergovernmental revenues
per household.

Hg:

PCTEMP— ratio of municipal employees
(less RSC employees) to total population.

(-)

H7 :

FREQ— number of RSC's per week.

(+)

H8 :

USERFEE— dummy variable coded "1" if a
RSC user fee is assessed, "O'' otherwise.

(+)

Hg :

NEWORL— dummy variable coded "1" if a
municipality is located in the metro
politan New Orleans area, "0" otherwise.

(+ )

(-)
(?)
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Louisiana municipalities file audited financial
reports with the Office of the State Legislative
Auditor, Baton Rouge, Louisiana every four years, two
years, or annually depending upon the size of the
municipality.

These reports were consulted when surveys

were returned incomplete.

Additionally, information

supplied via the survey was verified when possible.12
Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum values)

for each of the financial

and demographic variables are calculated for the two
groups of municipalities (i.e., municipal and contract).
A t-test is used to determine if the differences between
the means of the two groups with respect to each
financial and demographic variable are statistically
significant.
The logit model is used to test the extent to which,
municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the
municipal decision to privatize RSC.

Logit is an

appropriate statistical technique to use when the
dependent variable is dichotomous.

A chi-square test is

used to assess how well the model fits the data, as well

12Not all data could be verified because of the
different filing schedules.
If all municipalities were
required to file a report with the Legislative Auditor's
Office for the same reporting period the survey instrument
could have been shortened considerably.

as, to test the statistical significance of the
individual coefficients.

The hypotheses outlined above

are tested by determining the sign and statistical
significance of the individual coefficients in the logit
model.
Multicollinearity among the independent variables
in a logit model can make interpretation of the
individual coefficients difficult.

Therefore, two tests

for multicollinearity are conducted.

First, Pearson

Product Moment Correlation Coefficients and associated
significance levels are calculated to determine the
extent to which one independent variable is correlated
with another.

Second, each independent variable is

regressed, in turn, on the remaining independent
variables.

This is an effective technique to determine

if an independent variable can be expressed as a linear
combination of the remaining independent variables.

A

high coefficient of multiple determination (R2) for any
of these multiple regressions would indicate the
existence of multicollinearity among the independent
variables.
Summary
This chapter presents the method used to test the
extent to which municipal accounting data is useful for
modeling the decision to privatize RSC.

The research

question and research hypotheses are outlined.

The

logit model used to test the individual hypotheses is
also presented.

Finally, the method used to collect the

data, as well as, the statistical analyses are
discussed.

CHAPTER 5
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter reports the results of the study.

The

first section summarizes the procedures used to collect
the data.

The second section reports descriptive

statistics on each of the demographic and independent
variables.

The third section presents inferential

statistics regarding the financial and demographic
characteristics of the two groups of municipalities
(i.e., municipal and contract).

The fourth section

reports the results of the logistic regression (logit)
model.

The chapter concludes with a summary of the

empirical findings.
Data Collection
The population of interest for this study includes
all municipalities in the State of Louisiana.

According

to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S.
Bureau of the Census 1989), Louisiana contains 3 01
municipalities.

Specific data for this study include

financial and demographic data as well as information
regarding the method (i.e., municipal or contract) of
RSC.

Current data of this type are not readily
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available for small municipalities (population less than
10,000).

Because the majority of Louisiana

municipalities are small, a mail survey was used to
collect the data.

Mailing labels addressed to the city

clerk of each Louisiana municipality were secured from
the Governmental Services Institute of Louisiana State
University.

A survey instrument, reproduced in the

Appendix, was designed to collect the data necessary to
test the hypotheses set forth in the previous chapter.
The survey was mailed in three separate bulk mailings,
each approximately one month apart.
consisted of all 301 municipalities.

The first mailing
A second survey

was mailed to those municipalities that had not
responded within one month of the first mailing.

A

third and final survey was mailed one month after the
second mailing to those municipalities that had not
responded to either of the first two mailings.
When surveys were returned incomplete, the missing
data was obtained by consulting several alternative
sources.

Parish and municipal sales tax rates were

obtained from the State of Louisiana Department of
Revenue and Taxation.

Six of the surveys returned were

missing data regarding the number of households.

For

these municipalities the number of households was
estimated using a two-step procedure.

First, the 1980

population was divided by the 1980 number of households

to obtain the average number of persons per household.
Second, the current population was divided by the number
of persons per household calculated in the first step to
obtain an estimate of the number of current households.
RSC Arrangements in Use
The results of the survey indicate that there are
three primary RSC arrangements used by Louisiana
municipalities:
1. Municipal— where RSC is provided by municipal
employees,
2. Contract— where RSC is provided by a private
sector firm under contract with the municipality, and
3. Parish— where RSC is provided by a private
sector firm under contract with the parish government.
Typically, when the parish government contracts out RSC
(option 3 above) to a private sector firm, the parish
government levies a parish-wide sales tax to cover the
cost of RSC.

Under the parish option there is no

transfer of monies between the municipal government and
the parish government.

Because there is no transaction

reflected in the municipal accounting records under the
parish arrangement, municipalities using this mode of
RSC are not considered in this study.
A total of 184 municipalities (61%) responded to
the survey.

Table 5-1 shows the breakdown of the

responding municipalities by RSC arrangement.

Municipal

and contract account for 52% of the responding
municipalities.

Of the 184 responding municipalities 96

fall into the two groups of interest (i.e., municipal
and contract).

Thus a 32% usable response rate was

obtained.
TABLE 5-1
BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENTS BY RSC ARRANGEMENT
Percent of
Percent of
All Surveys
Usable
Arrangement_______ Number_________ Returned________ Returns
Municipal

43

23%

45%

Contract

53

29%

55%

Parish

72

39%

-

Other

16

9%

-

184

100%

Totals

100%

Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics aid in identifying the
location, spread, and shape of the underlying
distribution of a variable.

Tables 5-2 and 5-3 present

descriptive statistics for demographic and independent
variables respectively.

From these tables it is evident

that there is much variation in the data.

Also, many of

the variables appear to come from skewed distributions.
Prior to formal testing, it appears that municipalities
that privatize RSC are larger in terms of population,

the number of households, and the number of municipal
employees.
TABLE 5-2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Standard
Variable________ Mean_____ Deviation

Min._____ Max.

Population
Municipal
Contract

12,738
25,608

36,055
91,524

430
438

217,842
556,913

Households
Municipal
Contract

4,215
8,602

11,630
31,426

97
154

70,000
200,000

Employees
Municipal
Contract

147
251

411
952

1
4

2,382
5,991

From Table 5-3, total tax revenues per household
(TAXREV) appear higher in municipalities that contract
RSC.

In addition, the cost of RSC per household is

considerably lower in contract municipalities.

This

result is to be expected since one of the most cited
reasons for privatization is the cost savings generated.
It is interesting to note that the standard deviation
for REFUSE under the municipal arrangement is quite a
bit larger than under the contract arrangement.

This

finding suggests that the price charged by private
sector firms is relatively more stable than RSC costs
under the municipal arrangement.

This price stability

under the contract arrangement is probably due to the
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TABLE 5-3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Standard
Variable_________ Mean_____ Deviation

Min._______ Max.

TAXREV
Municipal
Contract

333.08
486.62

282.01
294.47

16.37
37.84

1,410.10
1,220.83

REFUSE
Municipal
Contract

82.14
67.34

44.59
25.99

13.80
6.81

212.68
144.09

PROPERTY
Municipal
Contract

83.96
101.47

124.50
193.43

0.00
0.00

734.83
1,403.28

DEBT
Municipal
Contract

318.74
389.49

575.30
566.71

0.00
0.00

2,631.06
2,718.52

GRANTS
Municipal
Contract

154.96
145.59

321.94
449.98

0.00
0.00

2,026.17
3,158.74

PCTEMP
Municipal
Contract

0.92
0.88

0.51
0.40

0.13
0.22

2.41
2.53

FREQ
Municipal
Contract

1.51
1.70

0.55
0.46

1.00
1.00

3.00
2.00

USERFEE
Municipal
Contract

0.79
0.87

0.41
0.34

0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00

NEWORL
Municipal
Contract

0.07
0.25

0.26
0.43

0.00
0.00

1.00
1.00

competitive market environment that private sector firms
operate in.
takers."

That is, private sector firms are "price

The variability observed under the municipal

arrangement may be due to the lack of competition in the
governmental environment.

Bureaucrats are able to set

their "prices" without the influence of the competitive
market.

Therefore, the cost of a particular service

(e.g., RSC) in different municipalities may vary
considerably.
Intergovernmental revenues per household (GRANTS)
are about the same for both contract and municipal
communities.

The same is true for the number of

municipal employees expressed as a percentage of total
population (PCTEMP).

In the next section a t-test is

used to formally compare municipal and contract
communities with respect to each of the demographic and
independent variables.
Inferential Statistics
Inferential statistics are concerned with making
generalizations about a population from the results
obtained from a sample (Lang and Heiss 1977, 2).

In

this section, municipal and contract communities are
compared with respect to each of the demographic and
independent variables.

The hypotheses tested in this

section seek to determine if municipalities that
privatize RSC exhibit demographic and financial

characteristics that are significantly different from
those that do not privatize RSC.

The alpha level for

determining statistical significance in this study is

.1 0 .
A two-sample t-test is a powerful technique for
testing the hypothesis that the difference between the
means of two groups is statistically significant.

The

accuracy of the two-sample t-test is dependent upon two
key assumptions:

(1) each of the populations are

normally distributed, and (2) the variance for each of
the populations are equal (Hays 1981, 286).

According

to Hays (1981, 287) the t-test is generally robust
against departures from normality.

However, the lack of

homogeneity of variance is critical when comparing
groups of unequal size.

When unequal sample sizes are

compared and the equality of population variances cannot
be assumed, a correction for the number of degrees of
freedom is recommended (Hays 1981, 287).

The SAS TTEST

procedure provides an F-test of the null hypothesis that
the population variances are equal.

In addition, a t-

statistic and corresponding significance level is
calculated under the assumption of equal variances as
well as under the assumption of unequal variances.

The

t-statistic under the assumption of unequal variances
incorporates a calculation for the number of degrees of
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freedom similar to the correction recommended by Hays
(1981, 287).
T-test results for each of the demographic
variables are shown in table 5-4.

The results indicate

that the two groups are not significantly different with
respect to:

(1) total population,

(2) the number of

households, and (3) the number of municipal employees.
TABLE 5-4
T-TEST RESULTS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Standard
Deviation

p-Value

Variable

N

Mean

Population
Municipal
Contract

43
53

12,738
25,608

36,055
91,524

-0.9380

0.3515

Households
Municipal
Contract

43
53

4,215
8,602

11,630
31,426

-0.9401

0.3505

Employees
Municipal
Contract

43
53

147
251

411
952

-0.7148

0.4770

Table 5-5 presents the t-test results for all
independent variables included in the logit model.

The

results indicate that municipalities that privatize RSC
have significantly higher tax revenues per household
(TAXREV), significantly lower RSC costs per household
(REFUSE), receive a significantly higher level of RSC
services (FREQ), and are more likely to be from the
metropolitan New Orleans area (NEWORL).

TABLE 5—5
T-TEST RESULTS FOR INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Variable
TAXREV
Municipal
Contract

N
43
53

Mean

Standard
Deviation

-Value

333.08
486.62

282.01
294.47

-2.5889

0.0112

REFUSE
Municipal
Contract

43
53

82.14
67.34

44.59
25.99

1.9271

0.0584

PROPERTY
Municipal
Contract

43
53

83.96
101.47

124.50
193.43

-0.5363

0.5931

DEBT
Municipal
Contract

43
53

318.74
389.49

575.30
566.71

-0.6042

0.5472

GRANTS
Municipal
Contract

43
53

154.96
145.59

321.94
449.98

0.1187

0.9057

PCTEMP
Municipal
Contract

43
53

0.92
0.88

0.51
0.40

0.4081

0.6843

FREQ
Municipal
Contract

43
53

1.51
1.70

0.55
0.46

-1.8014

0.0748

USERFEE
Municipal
Contract

43
53

0.79
0.87

0.41
0.34

-1.0044

0.3178

NEWORL
Municipal
Contract

43
53

0.07
0.25

0.26
0.43

-2.4565

0.0160

The findings indicate that the voters in
municipalities that privatize RSC face a greater tax
burden (TAXREV) than voters in municipalities using
municipal RSC.

This result is consistent with the a

priori notion that voters faced with higher tax levels
become politically active and pressure politicians to
reduce government spending levels (e.g., privatize
services).
The t-test of the difference in the cost of RSC per
household (REFUSE)

for the two groups of municipalities

indicates that contract RSC is significantly less costly
than municipal RSC.

This result supports the a priori

notion that private sector production is less costly
than public sector production.

However, this

statistical test does not hold constant other factors
that may influence the cost of RSC.

For example, higher

municipal RSC could be caused by the provision of a
higher level of services than contract RSC.

Therefore,

it is inappropriate to conclude from a t-test alone that
private sector production is necessarily less costly
than public sector production.
T-test results indicate that municipalities that
privatize RSC receive a higher level of services (FREQ)
than those that do not privatize RSC.

This is

consistent with the a priori notion that private sector
producers provide higher service levels than public

sector producers.

Combining the findings for REFUSE and

FREQ leads to the conclusion that private sector firms
provide a higher level of RSC services at lower costs
(including profit) than public sector employees.
In Louisiana, New Orleans is the largest
metropolitan area and therefore may possess
characteristics that are different from other
municipalities in the state.

The dummy variable NEWORL

is included in the model to capture any systematic
differences between municipalities in the New Orleans
area and those outside the New Orleans area.

The

results indicate that contract RSC is more likely for
municipalities in the metropolitan New Orleans area.
A t-test comparing communities that privatize RSC
to those that do not privatize RSC indicates that no
statistically significant differences exist with respect
to:

(1) the amount of property tax revenues generated by

the average household (PROPERTY), (2) the amount of
general obligation bonds outstanding per household
(DEBT), (3) the amount of intergovernmental revenues per
household (GRANTS), (4) the ratio of municipal employees
(minus RSC employees) to total population (PCTEMP), and
(5) the use of RSC user fees (USERFEE).
These results indicate that the amount of
additional funds available to the bureaucrat (PROPERTY,
DEBT, and GRANTS) are not significantly different in

municipal vs. contract communities.

The finding that

the difference in PCTEMP is not significantly different
suggests that municipal employees in municipal RSC
communities possess no more political clout than
municipal employees in contract RSC communities.

A

dummy variable, USERFEE, is included in the model to
represent the existence of a RSC user fee.
makes the cost of RSC explicit to voters.

A user fee
T-test

results indicate that contract RSC communities are no
more likely to assess a RSC user fee than municipal RSC
communities.
Tests of the Model
In this study, the dependent variable is the method
of RSC.

Two RSC arrangements are considered:

municipal RSC, and (2) contract RSC.

(1)

Nine hypotheses

are tested regarding the extent to which municipal
accounting data is useful for modeling the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.

Logit is an appropriate

method of determining the simultaneous effect of several
independent variables upon a dichotomous dependent
variable.

As in ordinary least squares (OLS) regression

analysis, multicollinearity among the independent
variables included in a logit model can cause
significant problems in the interpretation of the
results.

Therefore, the first step in the analysis is

to assess the degree of multicollinearity among the
independent variables in the logit model.
Two methods are used to assess the degree of
multicollinearity among the independent variables.
First, Pearson product moment correlations are used to
evaluate whether the independent variables in the model
are highly correlated with each other (i.e., bivariate
correlations).

Second, to assess whether one

independent variable can be expressed as a linear
combination of several of the others, each independent
variable is regressed, in turn, on the remaining
independent variables.
Tests for Detecting Multicollinearity
Stone and Rasp (1991, 173) identify collinear
predictor variables as one problem typically encountered
in accounting research.

While collinearity among

independent variables is prevalent in accounting
studies, the correlations need to be fairly high (i.e.,
0.70 or larger) before they present a serious problem.
Table 5-6 presents the Pearson product moment
correlation coefficients and associated significance
levels for all continuous independent variables in the
logit model.

While several of the correlations are

statistically significant, the correlation coefficients
are low to moderate.
5-6 are close to 0.70.

None of the correlations in Table
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TABLE 5-6
PEARSON'S PRODUCT MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

TAXREV

REFUSE

PROPERTY

DEBT

0.2956
(.0035)

0.5595
(.0001)
0.1637
(.1111)

REFUSE
PROPERTY

GRANTS

PCTEMP

0.4636
(.0001)

-0.0505
(.6254)

0.1975
(.0537)

0.1308
(.2041)

-0.0047
(.9635)

0.0872
(.3981)

0.4246
(.0001)

-0.0149
(.8855)

0.1402
(.1732)

-0.0450
(.6636)

0.1152
(.2638)

DEBT

0.0327
(.7520)

GRANTS

TABLE 5-7
RESULTS OF MULTIPLE REGRESSION
TESTS FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY
Dependent
Variable

df

TAXREV

87

8.58

.0001

.4410

REFUSE

87

1.24

.2850

.1025

PROPERTY

87

5.99

.0001

.3552

DEBT

87

4.76

.0001

.3044

GRANTS

87

0.45

.8887

.0396

PCTEMP

87

0.55

.8145

.0483

FREQ

87

1.49

.1723

.1205

USERFEE

87

1.18

.3229

.0976

NEWORL

87

1.78

.0921

.1406

F-Value

p-Value

R-Scruare

Table 5-7 presents the coefficient of multiple
determination (R2 ) for the multiple regressions when
each independent variable is regressed on the remaining
independent variables.

An R 2 close to 1.00 for any of

these multiple regression equations would indicate
significant multicollinearity.

While several of the

multiple regressions are statistically significant, the
R"Squares are low to moderate.

Therefore, the estimated

coefficients of the logit model do not appear to be
impaired by the effects of multicollinearity.
Logit Results
Public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy
are used to derive hypotheses concerning the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.

Municipal accounting

information is used to operationalize these hypotheses.
A logit model is used to test the extent to which
municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the
decision to privatize RSC.

The dependent variable in

the logit model is the method of RSC (METHOD).

The

usefulness of municipal accounting data for modeling the
decision to privatize RSC is judged by a chi-square test
of the null hypotheses that all coefficients for the
independent variables included in the model equal zero.
Rejection of this hypothesis is empirical evidence that
at least one, and possibly all, of the independent
variables is related to the privatization decision.

Each of the individual coefficients are tested for
statistical significance using a chi-square test.

In

addition, the sign of each coefficient is compared to
the a priori predicted sign.

A sign in the predicted

direction suggests that the theoretical model is capable
of not only identifying variables but also predicting
the direction of their effect on the privatization
decision.

Table 5-8 summarizes the results of the logit

model.
The statistical significance of the overall model
is determined by the value of the -2 Log L.R. statistic.
This statistic is interpreted in the same manner as an
F-test in an ordinary least squares regression.

That

is, the null hypothesis is that all of the coefficients
in the model are equal to zero.

The value of the -2 Log

L.R. statistic (p = .0003) leads to a rejection of the
null hypothesis and indicates that the overall model is
useful for explaining the decision to privatize RSC.

To

draw more conclusive inferences regarding the usefulness
of municipal accounting data for modeling the decision
to privatize RSC, the null hypothesis that each
coefficient equals zero is tested.

An interpretation of

the sign and significance of each of the independent
variables in the model follows.
The variable TAXREV (total tax revenues divided by
the number of households)

is a measure of the tax burden
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TABLE 5-8
SUMMARY OF LOGIT RESULTS

Variable

Expected
Coefficient
Sign

Std.
Error

ChiSouare

o-Value

TAXREV

+

0.0047

0.0014

10.75

0.0010

REFUSE

+

-0.0277

0.0095

8.55

0.0035

PROPERTY

-

-0.0031

0.0019

2.68

0.1016

DEBT

-

-0.0008

0.0006

1.91

0.1671

GRANTS

■?

-0.0001

0.0006

0.01

0.9212

PCTEMP

-

-0.6561

0.5772

1.29

0.2557

FREQ

+

0.9118

0.5226

3.04

0.0810

USERFEE

+

0.7518

0.6870

1.20

0.2738

NEWORL

+

2.1745

0.9083

5.73

0.0167

CONSTANT

•?

-0.8881

1.0152

0.77

0.3817

Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 30.62
(-2 Log L.R.) p = .0003

df.= 86

Classification Table For the Logit Model
Predicted
Municipal

Contract

Total

Municipal

29

14

43

Contract

12

41

53

Total
False positive rate:
False negative rate:

|

41
25.5%
29.3%

|

55

|

96

upon voters.

The notion that voters respond to an

increasing tax burden by pressuring politicians to
implement more efficient methods of service delivery
(e.g., privatization)

is supported by the positive sign

and statistical significance of the coefficient for
TAXREV.

The positive sign for this coefficient suggests

that the probability of privatization increases as the
tax burden per household increases.

This result is

consistent with the a priori expectation based on the
public choice model that states voters become
politically active when faced with an increasing tax
burden.

The null hypothesis that the coefficient for

this variable is equal to zero is rejected (p = .0010).
The coefficient for the variable REFUSE (cost of
RSC per household)

is significant (p = .0035).

However

the sign of this variable is opposite that of the a
priori predicted direction.

That is, the empirical

results indicate that the probability of privatization
decreases as the cost of RSC increases.

This finding is

unexpected since one of the most common reasons for
considering privatization is the expected cost savings.
A possible reason for this finding is that higher RSC
costs are associated with municipal collection13.
13The unexpected sign of this coefficient may be
due to the possible endogeneity of REFUSE to the model.
That is, the cost of RSC may influence the decision to
privatize, and privatization may impact on the cost of
RSC. Therefore, the relationship between REFUSE and the

DEBT (general obligation bonds outstanding divided
by the number of households) is a proxy for additional
funds available to the bureaucrat.

As the level of debt

outstanding increases, bureaucrats have more funds with
which to engage in "empire building" and other
inefficient activities.

Therefore, a priori, as DEBT

increases, the probability of privatization decreases
(i.e., the sign for this coefficient should be
negative).

The results indicate that the coefficient

for this variable is negative but insignificant
(p = .1671).

Therefore, the null hypothesis that this

coefficient is equal to zero cannot be rejected.
There are two possible reasons for DEBT not being
statistically significant.

First, DEBT may not be a

good proxy for additional funds available to the
bureaucrat. Second, additional funds available to the
bureaucrat may not impact on the privatization decision.
If DEBT is not a good proxy for additional funds
available to the bureaucrat a better proxy must be
found.

However, if additional funds available to the

bureaucrat do not impact on the privatization decision,
the theoretical framework needs to be re-examined.
Additional research is necessary to gain a better
decision to privatize RSC may be mutually dependent.
To
account for this possibility, the equation is reestimated using an instrumental variable (IV) procedure.
The results of the IV procedure are reported in Table 59.
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understanding of how (if) this variable influences the
privatization decision.
The coefficient for the variable GRANTS
(intergovernmental revenues divided by the number of
households)

is negative but insignificant (p = .9212).

No prediction was made a priori regarding the direction
of the sign for this variable.

The negative sign

suggests that as revenues received from
intergovernmental sources increase the probability of
privatization decreases.

This is consistent with the

notion that GRANTS is a proxy for additional funds
available to the bureaucrat.

Because these funds do not

come from the local taxpayers, a bureaucrat is able to
engage in "empire building" (e.g., employ municipal
workers for RSC) and other inefficient activities
without political pressure.

As stated above for DEBT,

two possible reasons exist for GRANTS not being
significant.

First, GRANTS may not be a good proxy for

additional funds available to the bureaucrat.

Second,

additional funds available to the bureaucrat may not
influence the decision to privatize RSC.

Additional

research is necessary to determine how (if) GRANTS
impacts the privatization decision.
Municipal employees represent a group of voters
with a vested interest in thwarting any attempt to
privatize municipal services.

The variable PCTEMP is

calculated by dividing the number of municipal employees
(less RSC employees) by the total population of the
municipality.

The coefficient for this variable is

negative but insignificant (p = .2557).

The negative

sign suggests that the probability of privatization
decreases as the proportion of the population composed
of municipal employees increases.

The insignificance of

PCTEMP may be due to the exceptionally small percentages
obtained for PCTEMP.

The highest value for PCTEMP

(2.5%), is associated with contract RSC.

However, the

next two highest values for PCTEMP (2.4% and 2.1%), are
associated with municipal RSC.

It is difficult for such

a small group of voters to have much influence on local
politicians.

The value of PCTEMP may need to be greater

than some threshold level before it becomes
statistically significant.
The variable FREQ is equal to the number of
residential sanitation collections per week and is a
proxy for service level.

This variable is included in

the model to control for any systematic differences in
RSC service level. The results support the a priori
prediction that communities requiring a higher level of
RSC service are more likely to privatize RSC.

The

results also support the notion that service level is a
factor in the privatization decision since the null
hypothesis that the coefficient for this variable is

equal to zero is rejected (p = .0810).
A dummy variable representing the use of a RSC user
fee (USERFEE) is included in the model to capture the
effect of making the cost of RSC explicit to the voters.
Voters are more likely to demand efficient operations if
they are aware of the cost of those operations.

The

results indicate that USERFEE does not impact the
decision to privatize RSC.

One explanation for this

finding is that most (85%) of the municipalities in the
sample assess a RSC userfee (90% of contract and 79% of
municipal).

Another possible explanation for this

finding is that taxpayers do not pressure politicians to
engage in cost reduction measures (e.g., privatization)
based on the cost of a single service.

That is, voters

look at the size of the government as a whole, not the
individual parts when deciding to become politically
active.

The null hypothesis that the coefficient for

this variable is equal to zero cannot be rejected
(p = .2738).
NEWORL is a dummy variable assigned a value of 1 if
a municipality is located in the metropolitan New
Orleans area and assigned a value of 0 otherwise.

New

Orleans is the largest metropolitan area in Louisiana.
It is possible that municipalities within the New
Orleans metropolitan area possess characteristics that
are systematically different from other municipalities

within Louisiana.

Therefore, the variable NEWORL is

included in the model to capture any systematic
differences that may exist because of a municipality's
proximity to the New Orleans area.
The coefficient for NEWORL is positive and
significant (p = .0167).

Therefore, cities that are

located in the metropolitan New Orleans area are more
likely to privatize RSC than those outside the New
Orleans area.

This result may be an indication that

there are some economies of scale available to private
sector firms operating in large metropolitan areas.
Economies of scale may exist because private sector
firms do not need to recognize political boundaries
(Spann 1977, 89).

Therefore, private sector firm can

choose an optimal level of operation in an area with a
large number of potential customers.

Another reason for

a higher propensity to privatize RSC in metropolitan
areas may be the level of demand for public services
that is characteristic of large metropolitan areas.
That is, the demand for public sector services in large
metropolitan areas may be greater than the capacity of
the public sector service system.

One method to

alleviate this strain is to contract services out to
private sector firms.

The empirical results support the

a priori prediction for this coefficient.
The results of the logit analysis indicate that the

overall model is significant (-2 Log L.R.

p = .0003).

This is interpreted as evidence that municipal
accounting data is useful for modeling the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.

Further, rejection of the

null hypothesis for individual coefficients is possible
for five of nine independent variables.

These results

should be considered in the context of a recent study by
Stone and Rasp (1991) that used a Monte Carlo simulation
to evaluate the effect of sample size, the distribution
of data, and collinearity among independent variables on
logit error rates.

Their results indicate that when

sample sizes are small (less than 200 observations), and
data is skewed, the null hypothesis for individual
parameter estimates are falsely rejected less frequently
than the alpha level indicates.

However, the null

hypothesis that the overall model has no explanatory
power is falsely rejected more often than the alpha
level indicates.

This leads to the conclusion that when

sample size is small and data is skewed (as in the
present study), tests of the individual coefficients
tend to be conservatively biased, while a test of the
overall model may produce a result that is overly
optimistic.
The classification table included in Table 5-8
indicates that 72.9% of the observations in the original
data set are classified correctly by the logit model.

This is better than the rate resulting from the use of a
naive model that classifies all municipalities as
contract (55.2%).

Caution must be used when

interpreting this result however.

If this model is

applied to a new data set, a similar level of accuracy
may or may not be achieved.
REFUSE may, to some degree, be determined by the
dependent variable METHOD.

To address the possibility

of REFUSE being endogenous, the logit model is reestimated using an instrumental variable (IV)- procedure.
The IV technique is a two-stage process.

In the first

stage, an ordinary least squares regression is performed
with REFUSE as the dependent variable.

The independent

variables (i.e., instruments) consist of data obtained
from the survey instrument.

In the second stage, the

predicted values from the first stage ordinary least
squares regression (REFUSE2) are entered into the
original logit model.

Table 5-9 presents the results of

the IV procedure.
A comparison of the re-estimated logit results with
the original logit results suggests that REFUSE is not
endogenous to the model.

In the original model the

coefficient of REFUSE is negative and significant
(p = .0035).

In the re-estimated model, the coefficient

of REFUSE2 is also negative and significant.

In
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TABLE 5-9
SUMMARY OF RE-ESTIMATED LOGIT RESULTS
Variable

Expected
Coefficient
Sicrn

Std.
Error

ChiSouare

D-Value

TAXREV

+

0.0044

0.0015

8.76

0.0031

REFUSE2

+

-0.0333

0.0194

2.95

0.0859

PROPERTY

-

-0.0027

0.0019

1.91

0.1673

DEBT

-

-0.0006

0.0005

1.43

0.2317

GRANTS

?

-0.0000

0.0006

0.00

0.9775

PCTEMP

-

-0.4550

0.5428

0.70

0.4019

FREQ

+

0.8451

0.4927

2.94

0.0863

USERFEE

+

0.5578

0.6702

0.69

0.4053

NEWORL

+

1.8667

0.8229

5.15

0.0233

CONSTANT

?

-0.3809

1.2605

0.09

0.7625

Value of chi-squared statistic for model: 21.26
(-2 Log L.R.) p = 0.0115.

df.= 84

Classification Table For the Logit Model
Predicted
Municipal

Contract

Total

Municipal

27

15

42

Contract

15

37

52

Total

42

52

94

Actual

False positive rate:
False negative rate:

28.8%
35.7%
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addition, all insignificant variables in the original
model remain insignificant in the re-estimated model.
All significant variables in the original model retain
their algebraic sign in the re-estimated model.

Only

one significant variable (PROPERTY) in the original
model (p = .1016) becomes insignificant in the reestimated model (it does however retain the same
algebraic sign).
The results of the re-estimated model are
reassuring.
suggested if:

The endogeneity of REFUSE would be
(1 ) the magnitude of the coefficients in

the re-estimated model changed radically from the
coefficients in the original model,

(2 ) the algebraic

sign of the coefficients in the original model changed
in the re-estimated model, and (3) significant
(insignificant) coefficients in the original model
became insignificant (significant) in the re-estimated
model.

The results of the IV procedure suggest that the

estimates obtained from the original model are robust
with respect to the possibility of REFUSE being
endogenous to the model.
Summary
This chapter presents the results of this study.
The evidence suggests that municipal accounting data is
useful in modeling the municipal decision to privatize
RSC.

More generally, the theoretical framework that is

used in this study may be useful for suggesting
municipal accounting data to model a variety of public
resource allocation decisions.

Table 5-10 presents a

summary of the results of the hypotheses tested in this
study.
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TABLE 5-10
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES TEST RESULTS
Null Hypothesis_____________________

Results

H]_:

Ceteris paribus, RSC costs per house
hold do not affect the decision to
privatize RSC.

REJECT
= .0035)

H2 :

Ceteris paribus, total tax revenues
per household do not affect the
decision to privatize RSC.

REJECT
= .0010 )

H3 :

Ceteris paribus, the amount of property
tax revenues generated by the average
household does not affect the decision
to privatize RSC.

REJECT
= .1016)

Ceteris paribus, the amount of general
obligation bonded debt outstanding per
household does not affect the decision
privatize RSC.

FAIL TO
REJECT

H4 :

H5 :

Ceteris paribus, the amount of inter
governmental revenues per household do
not affect the decision to privatize
RSC.

Hg:

Ceteris paribus, the ratio of the
number of municipal employees (less
RSC employees) to total population
does not affect the decision to
privatize RSC.

FAIL TO
REJECT

FAIL TO
REJECT

H7 :

Ceteris paribus, the frequency of RSC
does not affect the decision to
privatize RSC.

REJECT
= .0810)

H8 :

Ceteris paribus, the assessment of a
RSC user fee does not affect the
decision to privatize RSC.

FAIL TO
REJECT

Hg:

Ceteris paribus, the geographic
proximity of a municipality to the
metropolitan New Orleans area does
not affect the decision to privatize
RSC.

REJECT
= .0167)

CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the study and describes the
contribution it makes to the existing body of accounting
literature.
of the study.

The first section provides a brief overview
The second section discusses the

implications of the empirical results.

The third

section outlines the limitations of the study.

The

final section offers suggestions for future research.
Summary of the Study
This study investigates the determinants of the
municipal decision to privatize residential sanitation
collection (RSC).

Louisiana municipalities were

surveyed to obtain data regarding the method of RSC as
well as certain financial and demographic information.
This study examines two methods of RSC:

(1) municipal—

where RSC is carried out by municipal employees, and (2)
contract— where RSC is carried out by a private sector
firm under contract with a municipality.

Public choice

theory and the theory of bureaucracy guide the selection
of municipal accounting data useful for modeling the
municipal decision to privatize RSC.
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Nine hypotheses

derived from public choice theory and the theory of
bureaucracy are tested using logistic regression (logit)
analysis.

The logit model is statistically significant.

In addition, five of the nine independent variables are
statistically significant.

These results indicate that

municipal accounting data is useful for modeling the
municipal decision to privatize RSC.
Implications
One of the most common reasons for privatizing RSC
is the cost savings that result from private sector
production.

Many studies find support for the

hypothesis that contract RSC is less costly than
municipal RSC (Kitchen 1976; Savas 1977; Stevens 1978;
Bennett & Johnson 1979; McDavid 1985; and Berenyi &
Stevens 1988).

However, most of these studies

investigate municipalities with more than 25,000
residents.

The effect of privatizing RSC in small

municipalities (population under 1 0 ,000 ) has received
little attention in the literature, primarily due to the
lack of data availability for small municipalities.

The

present study uses data from Louisiana municipalities,
the majority of which are small (population under
10,000).

The results of this research are consistent

with prior research indicating that the cost of RSC is
significantly lower for contract RSC.

Prior research regarding public resource allocation
decisions uses public choice theory and/or the theory of
bureaucracy to guide the selection of independent
variables.

Typically, these studies use socioeconomic

data to operationalize the independent variables.

One

problem with socioeconomic data is that it is not always
available on a timely basis (e.g., Census of Government
data is only published every five years).

In general,

municipal accounting data is prepared at least annually.
Therefore, municipal accounting data provide a more
timely source of information for researchers
investigating public resource allocation decisions.
In the present study public choice theory and the
theory of bureaucracy guide the selection of municipal
accounting data useful for modeling the decision to
privatize RSC.

The results indicate that municipal

accounting data are useful for modeling the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.

Therefore, public choice

theory and the theory of bureaucracy appear to provide a
useful theoretical framework for accounting researchers
interested in investigating public resource allocation
decisions.
The results of this study support the notion that
voters react to the burden of taxation.

When the tax

burden per household increases, the probability of
privatization increases.

This finding suggests that

voters become politically active and put pressure upon
politicians to reduce taxes as their tax burden
increases.

To decrease the tax burden upon their

constituents, politicians may attempt to lessen the need
for additional tax revenues by reducing the level of
government expenditures.

One method to reduce public

expenditures is to provide services at the lowest
possible cost, and privatization of RSC is one method of
reducing the cost of RSC.

The empirical results suggest

that municipal accounting data reflect the behavior of
voters faced with an increase in their tax burden.
Furthermore, municipal accounting data also reflects the
behavior of politicians faced with dissatisfied voters.
The opportunity costs of becoming informed about
political issues and of voting are higher for wealthy
individuals.

Therefore, a greater degree of perceived

government waste and a higher level of tax burden is
necessary before voters in wealthy communities become
politically active.

Bureaucrats in wealthy communities

are able to exploit this political apathy by engaging in
"empire building" and other inefficient activities
(e.g., municipal RSC instead of contract RSC).

The

results of this study support the notion that wealthy
communities require a greater level of discontent before
becoming politically active.

The assessment of a user fee makes the cost of RSC
explicit to the voter.

A priori, it was expected that

knowledge of the cost of RSC would motivate voters to
become politically active and demand that RSC be
provided at minimum cost (i.e., privatized).

However,

the results suggest that the existence of a user fee
does not impact the decision to privatize RSC.

The

reason for this situation may be that the cost of a
single service (e.g., RSC) is not enough to motivate
voters to become politically active (i.e., it does not
force them out of their range of indifference).

This

finding suggests that voters base their evaluation of
local officials on overall performance rather than on a
particular issue.
In general, the population density of
municipalities in large metropolitan areas is higher
than those outside of large metropolitan areas.

Higher

population density puts a strain on service providers
(i.e., municipal governments).

One way to alleviate

this strain is to contract out certain services to the
private sector (e.g., RSC).

The results show that large

metropolitan areas are more likely to privatize RSC.
The results of this study support some conclusions
of prior research and refute others.

Ferris (1986)

finds that as the tax burden upon residents increases,
the percentage of publicly provided services contracted

out increases.

The present study supports this finding.

Alternatively, Ferris (1986) finds that as
intergovernmental revenues (e.g., state and federal
grants) as a percent of total revenues increase, the
percentage of municipal services contracted out
increases.

According to the present study,

intergovernmental revenues do not significantly affect
the decision to privatize RSC.
Ferris (1986) also finds municipal employees as a
percent of total population significant in the decision
to contract out services; as the ratio of public
employees to total population increases, the percentage
of services contracted out decreases.

This finding

suggests that public employees are able to thwart
attempts to privatize municipal services as their
political clout increases (i.e., as the ratio of
municipal employees to total population increases).
The present study does not support the contention
that public employees possess a significant amount of
political clout.

This finding is probably due to the

small size (population under 1 0 ,000 ) of the
municipalities in the sample.

Some municipalities have

so few public employees that even if they vote as a
group, they possess no more political clout than a
single voter.
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From a theoretical perspective, public employees
possess more political clout than the average resident
because they tend to be more politically active (Bennett
and Orzechowski 1983).

This by itself does not

guarantee political power however, since the number of
individuals in the group needs to be sufficiently large
to render the group politically effective.

Additional

research is necessary to determine how large a group
must be, relative to all voters, before it can
effectively wield political power in privatization
decisions.
A factor not in the model of the decision to
privatize RSC is the effect of municipal employee
unions.

Theoretically, municipal employee unions oppose

privatization on the grounds that privatization causes
municipal employees to lose their jobs.

However, the

number of unionized employees must be sufficiently large
to wield any political power.

While it is proper to

include a union variable in the model on theoretical
grounds, Louisiana municipalities have very little
unionization.
The major conclusion of this study is that public
resource allocation decisions are impounded in the
municipal accounting numbers, making it possible to
assess the accountability of public officials.
Therefore, municipal accounting data meet one of the

three broad objectives set forth in GASB Concepts
Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting.
Furthermore, public choice theory and the theory of
bureaucracy provide the theoretical underpinnings
necessary to develop models of public resource
allocation decisions using municipal accounting data.
One of the major functions of municipal accounting
is to accurately report financial transactions affecting
a municipality.

One of the major functions of

government accountants is to decide which information to
report.

According to GASB Concepts Statement No. 1

(GASB 1987, 27), ’’Financial reporting should assist in
fulfilling government's duty to be publicly accountable
and should enable users to assess that accountability."
Accordingly, government accountants must report
information that allows users to assess the performance
of public officials.

Public choice theory and the

theory of bureaucracy are both well established models
of how decisions are made in the public sector.
Therefore, governmental financial reports should reflect
public resource allocation decisions that are consistent
with public choice theory and the theory of bureaucracy.
The statistical analyses of the present study
demonstrate that municipal accounting data does indeed,
for the privatization decision, reflect relevant
information underlying public resource allocation

decisions.

The main contribution of this study lies in

establishing public choice theory and the theory of
bureaucracy as the critical linchpin that connects
municipal accounting data to public resource allocation
decisions.
The results of this study may be useful to the GASB
in setting governmental accounting standards.

The GASB

can look to public choice theory and the theory of
bureaucracy to guide the development of reporting
standards which accurately reflect public resource
allocation decisions.

Accounting academicians will also

benefit from the methodological contributions of this
study.

Academicians investigating public resource

allocation decisions should consider using public choice
theory and the theory of bureaucracy to link those
decisions to specific accounting variables.
The results of this study suggest that municipal
accounting data may by useful to private sector firms
attempting to target municipalities that are good
prospects (i.e., "ripe") for privatization.

For

example, a private firm may use the level of total taxes
per household as an indicator of communities that are
more likely to privatize.

Alternatively, the logit

model developed in this study may be used to identify
prospects for privatization.

The logit model calculates

the probability that a municipality privatizes RSC.

This probability is then used to classify each
municipality as either privatized or municipal.
Municipalities incorrectly classified as privatized are
those that, according to the model, should be
privatized.

Therefore, municipalities incorrectly

classified as privatized represent good prospects for
privatization.
The results of this study also suggest that
municipal accounting data provide information useful to
users such as bond underwriters and bond rating
agencies.

Bond underwriters and bond rating agencies

need data that accurately reflects the financial
dealings of a municipality.

The results of this study

suggest that municipal accounting data reflect decisions
that impact the financial status of a municipality.
Further, the results suggest that the decision to
privatize RSC may be a signal regarding the quality of
management in a municipality.

That is, it appear^ that

the decision to privatize RSC is typically made in
response to voters becoming politically active.
Political activity by voters is typically motivated by
the tax burden placed upon voters.

Therefore, bond

rating agencies and bond underwriters may view
privatization as a signal that voters will not be
favorably disposed to future tax increases necessary to
service general obligation debt.

Finally, the results of this study suggest that
municipal accounting data provides information useful to
government officials who are considering whether or not
to privatize government services.

Since municipal

accounting data provides indicators or signals regarding
when privatization is likely, the financial
characteristics of one municipality can be compared to
those of another municipality to aid in deciding when to
engage in privatization.
Limitations
One limitation of this study is that the results
may not be generalizable to municipalities outside
Louisiana.

To the extent that the political structure

and decision making approach used in Louisiana differ
systematically from municipalities outside Louisiana,
the results of this study are not relevant to
municipalities outside Louisiana.

However, the findings

of this study are consistent with the theoretical model.
Therefore, the application of the model used in this
study to a different data set should yield similar
results.
Another limitation is that the research design of
this study is by necessity quasi-experimental.

Two

important characteristics of quasi-experimental research
are (1) the absence of random assignment of subjects to
experimental and control groups, and (2) the inability
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of the researcher to manipulate independent variables.
In this study, municipalities self-select themselves
into one of two groups (i.e., municipal RSC or contract
RS C ) .

Therefore, self-selection bias may have been

present.

In addition, the degree of causality that can

be attributed to the independent variables is limited
because the independent variables were not manipulated
by the researcher in this study.
Suggestions for Future Research
The results of this study provide many directions
for future accounting research.

First, the model used

in this study should be employed to investigate the
municipal decision to privatize other municipal
services.

This would provide empirical evidence of the

robustness of the model.

Second, public choice theory

and/or the theory of bureaucracy should be used to
suggest municipal accounting data useful for modeling
public resource allocation decisions other than
privatization.
In this study, the amount of additional funds
available to the bureaucrat (GRANTS and DEBT) was not a
significant factor with respect to the municipal
decision to privatize RSC.

Future research should

attempt to determine whether GRANTS and DEBT are simply
poor proxies for additional funds available to the
bureaucrat, or if additional funds available to the
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bureaucrat do in fact impact on the privatization
decision.
According to the theoretical framework employed in
this study, the probability of privatization should
increase as the cost of RSC per household (REFUSE)
rises.

However, the empirical findings are the opposite

of the a priori expectation.

Future research should

attempt to determine whether the negative sign of the
REFUSE coefficient is an anomalous result.
According to Millar (1983, 192) a significant
number of municipalities abandon contract RSC and return
to municipal RSC.

Future research should attempt to

determine why municipalities abandon privatization.

In

addition, future research should compare the financial
characteristics of municipalities that abandon
privatization with the financial characteristics of
those that do not abandon privatization.

Public choice

theory and/or the theory of bureaucracy may be useful
for investigating these questions.
Savas (1979) suggests that municipalities
understate the "true" cost of municipal RSC.

Future

research should investigate how municipal accounting
systems can be modified so that all relevant costs are
included in the calculation of the cost of municipal
services.

A study of the true costs of providing

municipal services would presumably be useful to GASB in
the standard setting process.
Private sector firms sometimes submit low bids
(i.e., low ball) to secure government contracts.

After

the initial contract period, the contract price is then
increased.

Future research should attempt to determine

whether the cost savings associated with privatization
decrease over time and whether the existence of
competition in the private sector provides a measure of
control for the phenomenon of low balling.
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L egislative A uditor
S tate

of

Louisiana

BATON ROUGE. LOUISIANA 70804-9397

H O O R tvfA SO f N

P O BO« 94397
DA N IEL G KYLE. PH .D .. C P A
L e g isl a t iv e

J u l y 9 , 1990

a u d it o r

T e l 1504) 343*7337
FAJI (5041 343*7144

TO CITY CLERKS/MUNICIPAL FINANCE DIRECTORS
The Offi ce of the L e g i s l a t i v e Auditor i s c o o p e r a t i n g with a Louisiana
S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y g ra d ua te s t u d e n t in conducting a study of r e s i d e n t i a l s o l i d
waste ( i . e . , household garbage) c o l l e c t i o n .
This s t ud y i s f o r a doct oral
d i s s e r t a t i o n desi gned t o help in understanding t he methods and c o s t s of r e s i 
d e n t i a l s o l i d waste c o l l e c t i o n i n use i n L o u i s i a n a . Data f o r t h i s study i s
being compiled ( a t no c o s t t o t he s t a t e ) by Mr. Rich Brooks a t Louisiana
State University.
Mr. Brooks r e q u e s t s t h a t you r e f e r t o the e n c l os e d one page "Explanation
o f Terms" which d e f i n e s terms as they are used in t h i s s t u dy . Reference to
t h i s page wi l l a s s u r e t h a t the d at a submitted by a l l m u n i c i p a l i t i e s wi ll be
comparable. P l e as e complete t h i s r e p o r t and forward d i r e c t l y t o Mr. Brooks
by J u l y 31 , 1990.
Simply f o l d the r e p o r t as i n d i c a t e d and s t a p l e once so
t h a t t h e p o s t a g e - p a i d b u si n e s s r e p l y address i s showing.
Any q u e st i o n s r e g a r d i n g t h i s r e p o r t should be d i r e c t e d t o Rich Brooks a t
(504) 388-6221 o r (504 ) 769-7096.
I f you would l i k e a summary copy of the
r e s u l t s o f t h i s s t u d y , p l ac e an "X" i n the space below. Thank you very much
f o r your a s s is ta n c e .
Sincerely,

Daniel G. Kyle, CPA
L e g i s l a t i v e Au di tor
DGK/db
Attachment
3984b

P l e a s e send me a summary copy of t he r e s u l t s o f t h i s s t u d y .

158

Solid H as te Collection Report
Explanation of T e n s
A brief explanation of selected terms used in the enclosed Residential Solid
Haste Collection (hereafter RSWC) Report is provided bel ow so that the
information reported will be comparable. Please do n o t return this page.
Accrual Basis o f Acc ount ing— revenues are recorded whe n earned and expenditures
(or expenses) are recorded in the p e r iod in w h i c h they are incurred.
Cash Basis of Acc ounting— revenues are recorded w h e n cash is received and
expenditures are recorded whe n cash p a i d out.
Capital Outlays— expenditures for purchase and replacement of equipment, purchase
of land and existing structures, and construction.
Contract Out— whe n a local government hires and pays a private firm or other
government unit ( e . g . , parish) to collect residential solid w a s t e .
General Obligation Bonded Indebte dness— the amount of general obligation bonded
indebtedness outstanding at fiscal year end that is subject to the GOB debt limit
(see GOB Debt Limit below).
GOB Debt Limit— the maximum amount o f general obligation debt outstanding
allowable for your mun icipality u nd er Louisiana State Law.
Intergovernmental Rev enue s— includes grants, entitlements, and shared revenues
from all sources ( i . e . , federal, state, p a r i s h ) ; exclude your share of a parish
general sales tax as this should be reported as part of sales tax r e v e n u e s .
Modified Accrual Basis o f Acc o u n t i n g — revenues are recorded in the period in
w h i c h they become measurable and a v a i l a b l e , and expenditures are recorded at the
time a liability is incurred.
Payroll Expenditures— w a g e s , salaries and related fringe benefit costs.
Residential Solid H as te— discarded solid materials originating in residences
(i.e., household garbage, household refuse).
Revenues— do not include bond proceeds and/or operati ng transfers.
R S U — residential solid waste.
R S H C — residential solid waste collection.
Sales Tax Rev enue s— include your share of a p a r ish general sales tax.
Total RSHC Expenditures— includes salaries and wages of RSWC employees; fringe
benefit costs for RSWC e m p l o y e e s ; o pe rati on a n d maintenance of RSWC v e h i c l e s ;
depreciation on RSWC v e h i c l e s ; landfill fees; the portion of supervisors, clerks
and other support workers which c a n pro perl y be attributed to RSWC; and that
portion of overhead expenditures that can be properly attributed to RSWC.
Municipalities that contract out R S W C should report the amount paid to the parish
and/or private firm for RSHC.
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usnnrui solid iasti cohictioi upoit
Please type or print the sue, title, ltd phone nuiber of the person eoipletinj this report:
Sue:. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Title:_ _ _ _ _ _ _

■_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Phots lusher:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

fart 1: Geieral Isfomtioi
Please ote the lost recent data available to answer the following pestiens. ill itess relate to your sncicipality.
1. Sue of innicipality

______________

2. Popclitioc of innicipality

!. lather of households

______________

4. Total laid area (square tiles) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

5. Total assessed valuation

I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

6. Property tax rate (tills)

________

6. City sales tax rate

____ _

7. Coihited pariih/eity tales tax rate_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
S. lather of satieiptl eaployees

______________

11. lather of taticipal eiployees
it collective bargaining otits _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

%

10. lather of 1SIC eiployees

________

,_ _ _ _ _ _

12 .lest current bond ratios

.____________
Moody'sorStandardIPoor's (please circle ote)

13. Does the taticipality collect a user fee froi residents for is*:? (please circle appropriate response)

US

14. If t uer fee is collected, it is hilled: (please check appropriate response)
As a separate itei onthe taxbill
As a separate itei ona utility (e.g., water, sewer, etc.) hill
Separately froi all other hills
Other (please describe)
________________________________ _
15. Ihich of the following foods do you use to account for isv: revenues i expenditures? (please chech appropriate response)
General fond
Enterprise fond
Other fond (please describe),_ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .____
IS. that basis of accounting is osed for 1SVC revenues S expenditures? (please check appropriate response)
Accrual basis
Modified accrual basis
Cash basis
17. Ihich of the following in: irrangeients is (are)used in your innicipality? (please chechappropriate response(s);
lonicipal eiployees collect ts»
Private sector eiployees collect ESI (innicipality contracts eitherdirectly or via parish governient)
Parish governient eiployees collect isv (innicipality contracts with parish governient)
Citizens hire private haulers or dispose of solid waste theiselves
Other (please describe)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
II. If 1ST is contracted out, please provide the naie of the parish and/or private firs, and the year in
which contracting ont vas initiated:
lirish/lin_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Tear

10

Put II: Kxpuiitires
Pleise ne tbe list recent ratal de'.i available to etsier tbe Icllovisg goestiots.
I u «:t; ills iroi tbe 12 lottb period ending:

Bof.b_ _ _ _ _ _ _ leer__

l_

2D.. total general hid expenditures
erclidinc cepitil ontleys

food types)

J.

22. total 15VC expendittres
U S M l i capital ontleys

22. tetal piyroll (ill uplcyees;

I.

24. foul isv: piyroll

If. total expendittres
(ill govertiental iotd types)
21. total expettei
(ill proFtietiry

25. Central obligation bonded
indtbiedness (it iissil yet: etd)l_

24. COE debt liiit

Pert III: lemies
Please tse tbe tost recent mneal dete available to ansver tbe iollcirin; gtestions
1 ib isirg diti froi tbe 12 lottb period ending:

Knntb_ _ _ _ _ _ _ Tear__

27. Util property tu revenoes

I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

2E. lntergoverniental revenues
(111 gcvemientel find types)

2S. totalteles tu revtnces

I.

3D. total metces
(ill govertientil food types)

31. Otbertu revenoes

l_

32. Inttigovtrtienlil revenots
(ill proprietary find types)

33. totaltu mantes

S.

34. total remnes
(ill proprietary find types)

35. leTisnes froi isv: ise: fees

|_

3E. total general food mecoes

Pert IV: Put (tunes
37. IftC sales tu revenoes

I.

Part V: idditional lifonation
Please provide tbe folloviog icfcrestioi if available.
31. ISV Is collected it tbe (please circle]

COU

IUIT

litlOOOt

39. ire residents renlred to cse plastic or paper bag: is gerbege containers (u opposed to girbege cans)?
40. Pregnancy of ISVC (ember of picl*cps per wet): ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
41. tbe tuiici iciber of cootaioers tbit i bonsebold eay pot oot per collection is:
n u i too tot ton coonutioi u com m it m s upon
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